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HIGH CRIMES AND MISCONCEPTIONS:
THE ICC AND NON-PARTY STATES
MADELINE MORRIS*
I
INTRODUCTION
The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court (“ICC”)1 provides for
the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.2 Those crimes often are committed by or
with the approval of governments. It is unlikely that a government sponsoring
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity would consent to the prosecution of its national for his or her participation. Therein lies the problem with an
international criminal court that may exercise jurisdiction only if the defendant’s state of nationality consents. The very states that are most likely to be
implicated in serious international crimes are the least likely to grant jurisdiction over their nationals to an international court.
The ICC Treaty avoids the dismal prospect of an international criminal
court that cannot obtain jurisdiction over international criminals. The treaty
provides that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of states
that are not parties to the Treaty and have not otherwise consented to the
court’s jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that, in addition to jurisdiction based on
Security Council action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and
jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant’s state of nationality, the ICC
will have jurisdiction to prosecute the national of any state when crimes within
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state
that is a party to the treaty or that consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.
That territorial basis would empower the court to exercise jurisdiction even in
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This article is a modified version of a chapter by the same title appearing in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
[hereinafter ICC Treaty].
2. See id. art. 5. While the ICC Treaty also provides for jurisdiction over the crime of aggression,
see id. art. 5(1)(d), the treaty further provides that the ICC shall not exercise that part of its subjectmatter jurisdiction until such time as the treaty is amended to include provisions defining the crime of
aggression and setting out the conditions under which the court will exercise jurisdiction over that
crime. See id. art. 5(2).
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cases where the defendant’s state of nationality is not a party to the treaty and
does not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.3
The United States has objected to the ICC Treaty on the ground that, by
purporting to confer upon the court jurisdiction over the nationals of nonconsenting non-party states, the treaty would bind non-parties in contravention
of the law of treaties.4 This objection has given rise to a heated controversy that
has focused on the particulars of the international law of treaties and of jurisdiction. On close inspection, however, we can detect a more basic issue struggling
to make its way to the surface.
The fundamental issue concerns the nature of the ICC as an international
institution. The jurisdictional structure of the ICC is based on a view of the
ICC as a criminal court, tout court. In this view, the job of the ICC is to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of individuals accused of recognized international
crimes. With this model in mind, it makes sense to give the court meaningful
powers of compulsory jurisdiction, lest perpetrators of serious international
crimes should escape justice. From this perspective one might reason that, if
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is limited to established international
crimes and the process of the court is fair, then no state–whether party or nonparty–should have legitimate objections to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over its nationals.
The deficiency of this approach is that it reflects only one of the two types of
cases that the ICC will be called upon to decide. In addition to the cases that
are concerned solely with individual culpability, there will be ICC cases that focus on the lawfulness of official acts of states. Even while individuals, and not
states, will be named in ICC indictments, there will be cases in which those in-

3. Note, however, the gap in jurisdiction. If a crime is committed by a non-party national on that
non-party’s territory, then the ICC may not exercise jurisdiction. So, even if the ICC had existed at the
relevant time, it would not, for example, have been able to exercise jurisdiciton over the crimes of Pol
Pot in Cambodia or Kambanda in Rwanda if Cambodia or Rwanda, respectively, were non-parties to
the ICC Treaty. In this way, the ICC’s effectiveness as an enforcement mechanism is significantly limited.
See id. art. 12. Article 13(a) of the treaty articulates a third condition permitting the exercise of ICC
jurisdiction. Even in the absence of the nationality or territoriality preconditions articulated in Article
12, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction if the case arises from a situation referred to the ICC prosecutor
by the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See id. art. 13.
Where the defendant’s state of nationality is a party to the ICC Treaty or specially consents to ICC
jurisdiction for the case in question, the ICC’s jurisdiction is founded on the consent of the state of nationality. Where ICC jurisdiction is based on Security Council action, the jurisdiction also arguably
rests on the consent of the state of nationality (assuming that it is a U.N. member state) through its
membership in the U.N., which entails consent to cooperate with Security Council actions taken under
Chapter VII. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25. But see Brief for the Appellant, Prosecutor v. Tadic, International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (arguing that the Security Council is
inherently incapable of legitimately establishing a judicial organ). The present article will focus not on
these consent-based foundations for ICC jurisdiction but, rather, on the territorially based foundation
which, by the terms of the treaty, allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states that
have not consented to its jurisdiction.
4. See David Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, The International
Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law (Mar. 26, 1999) (on file with author).
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dividuals are indicted for official acts taken pursuant to state policy and under
state authority. These official-act cases may well include cases in which an official state act is characterized as criminal by the ICC prosecutor (acting, very
possibly, on a referral from an aggrieved state), while the state whose national is
being prosecuted maintains that the act was lawful. One can readily imagine
ICC cases in which the act forming the basis for the indictment was a military
intervention, deployment of a particular weapon, recourse to a certain method
of warfare, or other official conduct that the responsible state maintains was
lawful. Or the act forming the basis for the indictment might be an alleged official act that the concerned state maintains never occurred. In these sorts of ICC
cases, notwithstanding the presence of individual defendants in the dock, the
cases will represent bona fide legal disputes between states.
When the ICC is hearing cases in the official-acts category, its function will
resemble less that of a municipal criminal court than that of an international
court for the adjudication of interstate legal disputes. The shortcomings of the
ICC jurisdictional structure and of the arguments that have been advanced in
support of that structure stem from the fact that this second aspect of the ICC’s
character, that of a court for interstate dispute adjudication, is not adequately
taken into account.
There is a range of mechanisms for the resolution of interstate disputes.
Adjudication is among them, but is not always the approach best suited to a
given dispute. Because in many circumstances states see diplomatic, nonadjudicatory dispute resolution as posing fewer risks and offering potentially
more constructive resolutions than litigation would, states often are reluctant to
submit their disputes to third-party adjudication. As we shall see, states are
particularly unwilling to enter into broad commitments to adjudicate future disputes, the content and contours of which cannot be foreseen.
The interest of states in retaining discretion as to their methods of addressing interstate disputes is reflected in the jurisdictional structures of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and of specialized international courts of such as
the Law of the Sea Tribunal and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement system. The constituting instruments of those international
courts reserve to states broad discretion over whether and when those courts
will have decisionmaking authority.
The drafters of the ICC Treaty faced the dilemma of needing to fashion a
jurisdictional scheme for the ICC that would be sufficiently aggressive to make
the court effective in the prosecution of criminals but also sufficiently consensual to make the court a suitable institution for the adjudication of international
disputes. A genuine quandary is posed by the need for a jurisdictional structure
that will foster the ICC’s effectiveness as a criminal court without engendering
overreaching by the ICC into areas of interstate dispute settlement in which
states have legitimate rights of discretion regarding methods and fora. The following discussion attempts to gain some purchase on the issue of the ICC’s ju-
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risdiction over non-party nationals by considering the court’s jurisdictional
structure in the light of this dilemma.
This article begins by examining the interests of states with respect to the jurisdiction of international courts and the consequent patterns in the jurisdictional structures of existing international courts. That section will conclude by
evaluating the significant differences between the jurisdictional structure of the
ICC and that of other international courts in light of the ICC’s dual character as
the adjudicator of individual culpability and of interstate legal disputes. Proceeding from that analytic basis, the subsequent sections will examine the
strengths and the shortcomings of the theories supporting ICC jurisdiction over
non-party nationals. The article will conclude that the ICC’s jurisdictional
structure and, more specifically, its provision for jurisdiction over non-party nationals, cannot be satisfactorily justified and that this is so, ultimately, because
the ICC’s role as an adjudicator of interstate disputes is not adequately accounted for in the Court’s jurisdictional design.
II
THE JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE INTERSTATE DISPUTES
States are notoriously reluctant to submit their disputes to binding thirdparty adjudication. Despite a dramatic increase in the use of binding thirdparty adjudication at the international level in recent years, the use of such
mechanisms to resolve international disputes remains minimal in comparison
with the use of diplomatic means for addressing such disputes. The relative
dearth of interstate disputes brought to the ICJ has given rise to extended consideration of why states make such limited use of the ICJ and how greater use
might be encouraged.5 The fact, quickly noted in discussions of the limited state
use of the ICJ, is that states–perhaps more specifically, foreign ministry officials–are reluctant to relinquish control over their disputes to third parties, on
either an ad hoc or a compulsory basis.6 Such reluctance may be partly explained by states’ concerns with a court’s procedures or structure.7 But even in

5. See, e.g., JOHN G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 164-66, 285-311 (3d ed.
1998); K. Hubbard, Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Revised Role for the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 168 (1985); Arthur Rovine, The National Interest and the
World Court, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Leo Gross ed., 1976);
Gerald Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in II THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 461-98 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds., 1974); L.V. Prott, The Future of the International Court of Justice, 33 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 284 (1979).
6. See Rovine, supra note 5, at 317; Richard Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2-4 (1982); Richard Falk, Realistic Horizons
for International Adjudication, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 315, 321-22 (1971).
7. See Leo Gross, The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the International Legal Order, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 22-104 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); Edvard Hambro, Will the Revised Rules of Court Lead to
Greater Willingness on the Part of Prospective Clients?, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 365-76 (Leo Gross ed., 1976); Leo Gross, Review of the Role of the International
Court of Justice, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 479 (1972).
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the absence of such concerns, there is a more fundamental reluctance to submit
to third-party adjudication that rests on the perceived advantages to states in
some circumstances of retaining control over the resolution of their disputes.8
As Arthur Rovine has put it, “[i]t is one thing to show that resort to the ICJ is
preferable to war or armed conflict; it is quite another matter to demonstrate
that judicial processes are as valuable as ordinary out-of-court bargaining and
discussion.”9
When a dispute involving allegations of war crimes, genocide, or crimes
against humanity involves unsettled law or ambiguous facts, compulsory binding adjudication may not be the most constructive or appropriate method of
dispute resolution. While the most flagrant instances of, say, genocide leave no
basis for dispute or negotiation, many cases involving allegations of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or, especially, war crimes are more complex, factually
or legally or both.
Resolving interstate disputes through negotiation and other diplomatic
means often is perceived by states as less risky and potentially more constructive than submitting the disputes for third-party adjudication. This is so for a
number of reasons. Diplomatic approaches maintain the possibility of leaving
the issue in abeyance should matters develop such that non-resolution appears
preferable to immediate resolution.10 Diplomatic methods are likely to result in
less damage to the standing and prestige of the losing state, if there is in fact an
identifiable loser. This consideration is heightened in cases where a loss would
entail a finding that the losing state had been engaged in wrongdoing. In addition, diplomatically negotiated resolutions do not create legal precedents in the
way that reasoned and published legal opinions inevitably do. States may fear
the creation of an authoritative (even if not binding) precedent contrary to their
interests and, moreover, may object to the prospect of an international court, in
effect, legislating international law where the litigated issue concerns an unsettled area of law.11 Another influential factor is that, in a dispute between any
two states, one party is likely to have a political advantage, a stronger bargaining position, that would be significant in the diplomatic arena but might be of
little effect in an adjudicated settlement.12 Moreover, diplomacy leaves room
for compromise resolutions that adjudication generally does not.13 Retaining
control over a dispute allows states to respond in a nimble and nuanced way as
a controversy and the options for its resolution unfold. All of this states are
unwilling to give up wholesale.
8. See Rovine, supra note 5; Fitzmaurice, supra note 5, at 462-73.
9. Rovine, supra note 5, at 314.
10. See id. at 317, 319.
11. See Paul Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in II THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 499-549 (Leo Gross ed., 1976) (“[T]he prospect that increased activity by the Court will help fill interstices in the international legal fabric or even expand its
bounds, is likely to constitute, among diplomats, a negative rather than a positive argument for [enhancing the court’s caseload].”); Rovine, supra note 5, at 315-16.
12. See id. at 319-20.
13. See Bilder, supra note 6, at 2-4; Falk, supra note 6, at 321-22; Rovine, supra note 5, at 317.
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Generally, the more important and sensitive the subject of a dispute is to a
state, the less willing the state is to submit the dispute for third-party adjudication.14 Equally, the more uncertain the adjudicated outcome of a particular dispute would be, the less willing a state will be to submit to binding third-party
adjudication.15 By extension, if states frequently are unwilling to submit for adjudication disputes that are important and whose adjudicated outcomes would
be uncertain, states also will be unwilling to make broad grants of jurisdiction in
advance that could later prove to include important disputes whose adjudicated
outcomes would be uncertain. As Professor John Merrills has observed,
[P]robably the most striking feature of adjudication is that it is dispositive. Because
the decisions of courts and tribunals are treated as binding, litigation is a good way of
disposing of a troublesome issue when the resolution of a dispute is considered to be
more important than the result. Conversely, when the result is all-important, adjudication is unlikely to be used because it is simply too risky. These attitudes are reinforced by the fact that adjudication is not merely dispositive, but tends to produce a
winner-takes-all type of solution. This can obviously render an unfavourable outcome
a catastrophe and so encourages states to choose other procedures for disputes which
they cannot afford to lose.
Because adjudication is dispositive the attitude of states toward compulsory jurisdiction is conspicuously ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a good deal of support for
the principle of the optional clause and similar arrangements [allowing states to consent in advance to the jurisdiction of an international court over future disputes, subject to such reservations as each state may make], since the idea of establishing a
binding system to resolve international disputes is an attractive one. On the other
hand, as soon as such arrangements are established, states become aware of the risks
involved in a commitment to litigate disputes which cannot be foreseen and begin to
have second thoughts. The result . . . is a reluctance to subscribe to the more general
arrangements for compulsory jurisdiction and a preference for agreements concerned
16
either with particular types of cases or individual disputes.

Certainly, states sometimes do choose to submit their disputes for thirdparty adjudication. But, cognizant of both the advantages and the drawbacks of
adjudication, states jealously guard their prerogative to select the circumstances
under which they will do so. States’ insistence on this prerogative has, in general, been viewed as legitimate (even while many have sought to expand consensual use of the ICJ17) and has been reflected in the treaties providing for
third-party adjudicatory mechanisms.
All existing international courts have contentious jurisdiction18 only over
disputes involving states that are parties to treaties providing for their jurisdiction.19 Inspection of those treaties reveals that, in general, states have not seen
14. See Falk, supra note 6, at 321; Fitzmaurice, supra note 5, at 488;. Rovine, supra note 5, at 31920.
15. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 5, at 473; Szasz, supra note 11, at 511.
16. MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 293-94.
17. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5.
18. The contentious jurisdiction of an international court is the court’s jurisdiction to decide interstate disputes as distinct from its authority to render advisory opinions or to exercise other, incidental
powers.
19. See UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES 70 (1992) (“Settlement of international disputes by international courts is subject to the recognition by the states concerned of the jurisdiction of the courts over such disputes.”).
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fit to relinquish discretion over jurisdiction entirely, even by treaty. Rather, the
treaties establishing international courts have been designed to afford states
parties significant continuing discretion over the powers that the respective
courts will have relative to jurisdiction and, relatedly, to remedies. This is true
of the ICJ, the Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, and the WTO dispute settlement
system, which will serve as three principal examples, as well as of other international courts.20
The contentious jurisdiction of the ICJ depends on the consent of the states
that are parties to the dispute.21 Consent to ICJ jurisdiction may be given in advance either through a compromissory clause in a treaty providing that some or
all categories of disputes arising under that treaty will be submitted to the ICJ
or through a declaration under the ICJ Statute’s “optional clause.”22 By making

20. See generally id.; MERRILLS, supra note 5 (providing a survey of the jurisdictional and other
features of international dispute resolution mechanisms); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL
ASPECTS (C.M.H. Waldock ed., 1972) (same).
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
provide contrasting examples insofar as each has automatic jurisdiction over states parties to the
treaties establishing the court. On examination, however, we see that neither of those courts in fact
constitutes a counterexample to the proposition that states generally maintain significant continuing
discretion over the powers that international courts will have relative to jurisdiction and, relatedly, to
remedies.
The ECJ must be distinguished from other international courts because it is the court of the
European Communities. The European Communities, even while they are constituted by inter-state
organizations, are part of a system of close regional economic integration. We would expect that the
degree of authority that member states would be willing to vest in the European Communities’ court
would be greater than that which states would ordinarily be willing to vest in an international court that
was not a constitutive part of an integrated regional economic system.
The ECHR, by contrast, is a creature of the Council of Europe. See FRANCIS JACOBS & ROBIN
WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (1996). The ECHR has jurisdiction
over all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the European Convention on Human
Rights, including violations by states parties of that convention and the human rights delineated
therein. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 32(1), 33, 34. However, while the jurisdiction of
the ECHR is compulsory, the provisions for remedies and for enforcement of ECHR decisions leave
those matters to be decided largely through diplomatic and political processes within the Council of
Europe. Where the court finds that a state party has committed a violation, its judgment will so
indicate and provide the reasons for its finding. It may also award compensation and costs. See LUKE
CLEMENTS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION 103
(1999). It will not, however, specify other measures, such as legal or structural reforms, that the
offending state party might need to take to remedy the violation (for example, where the violation is
ongoing). See id. The convention provides that “[t]he judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to
the Committee of Ministers which shall supervise its execution.” European Convention on Human
Rights art. 46(2). The Committee of Ministers is comprised of the foreign ministers of the member
states of the Council of Europe. See CLEMENTS ET AL., supra, at 9-10. That Committee, in some cases,
then negotiates with the offending state party concerning what remedial measures will be taken. The
convention does not provide for sanctions for failure to implement an ECHR decision. Therefore, the
actions that may be taken by the Committee of Ministers in negotiating the remedial measures for an
ECHR decision and in ensuring its enforcement are limited to various forms of political pressure. See
JACOBS & WHITE, supra, at 398. In sum, the power ceded to the ECHR in the court’s jurisdictional
structure is somewhat qualified by the remedial and enforcement structures.
21. See generally MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 121-45 (on the organization and procedures of the
ICJ).
22. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36(2), 59 Stat. 1055, 3
Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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a declaration under the optional clause, a state agrees to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction for some or all categories of future disputes.
A compromissory treaty clause giving jurisdiction to the ICJ tends to be
more readily acceptable to states where the clause concerns a narrowly defined
subject matter23 than where the jurisdiction conferred is more open-ended.24
State practice in the use of the optional clause of the ICJ Statute shows similar
tendencies for states to be conservative with regard to making grants of jurisdiction in advance. Fewer than a third of the members of the United Nations currently have in force declarations under the optional clause,25 and many of those
states have made reservations substantially limiting the effect of their declarations.26
If consent to ICJ jurisdiction covering a given dispute has not been expressed in advance, the dispute may nevertheless be submitted for ICJ adjudication by special agreement of the parties.27 In making such a special agreement,
the parties may frame the legal issue in dispute and, to some extent, the basis on
which the court should decide the issue.28 Even in cases when the ICJ would
have jurisdiction on another basis, the parties may choose for the ICJ to adjudicate pursuant to a special agreement.29
The jurisdiction of the ICJ, based as it is on a combination of compromissory clauses, optional-clause declarations, and special agreements, is quite thoroughly consent-based. Unsurprisingly, controversies have arisen regarding
whether the interests of a non-consenting, third-party state would, in effect, be
adjudicated in a case brought by other parties before the court. In the Montary
Gold case, four states that wished to submit a dispute for adjudication had all
accepted ICJ jurisdiction. The ICJ nevertheless declined to adjudicate the case
because Albania, whose property rights were the subject of the dispute, had not
23. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 241, attached to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, attached to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. The Optional Protocol and
Convention of 1961 have 61 and 174 parties respectively. The Optional Protocol and Convention of
1963 have 44 and 153 parties respectively. See CHRISTIAN L. WIKTOR, MULTILATERAL TREATY
CALENDAR 1648-1994, at 726-27 (1998).
24. See, e.g., American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (“Pact of Bogata”); European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 243,
each of which has 13 states parties, many of whom have attached significant reservations. See WIKTOR,
supra note 23, at 485, 657.
25. See MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 123; see also John Merrills, The Optional Clause Revisited, 64
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 197 (1993) (analyzing states’ practice in use of the optional clause).
26. See id. See generally, Szasz, supra note 11, at 511 (observing that “[s]tates are reluctant to submit to international courts, particularly in broad terms and in advance”).
27. See ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 36(1); UNITED NATIONS, supra note 19, at 71-72, and
sources cited therein.
28. See MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 122-23.
29. See, e.g., Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on Dec. 23, 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960
I.C.J. 192 (judgment of Nov. 18) (exercising jurisdiction pursuant to a special agreement notwithstanding that the court also would have had jurisdiction on other bases).
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so consented.30 The principle of the Monetary Gold decision has subsequently
been further clarified. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that the requirement
for consent to jurisdiction by each party to the dispute applied only where the
legal interests of the non-consenting state “would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject matter of the decision.”31
The ICC Treaty’s jurisdictional provisions stand in stark contrast to those of
the ICJ Statute. In ICC cases in which a state’s national is prosecuted for an official act that the state maintains was lawful or that the state maintains did not
occur, the lawfulness or the occurrence of that official state act–that is, the question whether the state had a right to take such action or whether it did so–would
“form the very subject matter of the dispute.” Yet, by the terms of the ICC
Treaty, the ICC would exercise jurisdiction in that case with or without the consent of the state whose official acts would form the subject of the adjudication.
Not only the ICJ with its open-ended subject-matter jurisdiction, but also international courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction have jurisdictional structures reserving significant discretion to states. Two principal examples of such
courts are the Tribunal on the Law of the Sea32 and the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.33
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) provides that, if states are unable to settle their disputes relating to the convention
through a prompt “exchange of views,”34 then the convention’s “Compulsory
Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions” come into operation.35 Those procedures afford states an array of methods of binding dispute resolution from
which they may select.
UNCLOS provides that each state party shall make a declaration accepting
the jurisdiction of at least one of four enumerated tribunals: the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal, and a special arbitral tribunal. If both parties have accepted the same tribunal, then that tribunal

30. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., N. Ir., and U.S.), 1954
I.C.J. 19 (June 15).
31. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 431 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of Nov. 26); see also Certain Phosphate Lands in
Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240 (Preliminary Objections and Judgment of June 26) (following
same rationale); Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (Judgment of June 30) (same).
32. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, annex VI, Statute for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1345.
33. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, annex 2, Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
For comprehensive treatments of the mechanisms for settlement of interstate disputes on specified
subject areas, see UNITED NATIONS supra note 19, 135-53; INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL
ASPECTS, supra note 20, ch. 4.
34. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 283,
21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
35. See id. part IV § 2. The convention also provides for a specialized Sea-Beds Dispute Chamber
with jurisdiction specific to disputes regarding the convention’s arrangements regarding the deep seabed. See MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 187- 90.
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(or another to which both parties agree) will be used. In the absence of such a
match, the dispute may be referred to arbitration.
In addition to the considerable flexibility afforded by UNCLOS regarding
methods of binding settlement, the convention also exempts from the compulsory settlement system certain subject areas.36 Article 297 exempts from compulsory settlement those disputes that relate to enumerated areas involving the
sovereign rights of coastal states.37 Article 298 permits exemption, at the option
of each state party, of disputes relating to sea boundary delimitations and related matters, disputes being addressed by the U.N. Security Council and, most
significantly for comparison with the ICC, disputes concerning military activities.38 For disputes concerning these specified subject areas, the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms that are otherwise applicable are available, but can
be used only with the consent of all parties to the dispute.39 The UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanisms thus retain considerable discretion for states regarding the forms of binding third-party settlement that they will accept and,
equally significantly, allow states to exempt entirely from compulsory jurisdiction disputes concerning particularly sensitive areas, including military activities.
The dispute settlement system for the World Trade Organization is organized in rather a different way, still reserving to states significant flexibility relating to third-party adjudications, but providing that flexibility more in the
remedy provisions than in the jurisdictional structure. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding40 provides that, when diplomatic means are unavailing in
resolving a dispute arising under the covered trade agreements,41 the dispute
will be settled through the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). In somewhat
simplified form, the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that the DSB
will create a panel that will assess the facts and law of the dispute and “make
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendation or in
giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.”42 The panel’s final
report must, within sixty days of its submission, be adopted by the DSB unless
either there is a consensus within the DSB not to adopt or a party has given notice of appeal.43 Appeals are limited to issues of law.44 The appellate report is
submitted to the DSB and must be unconditionally accepted by the parties unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.45

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See UNCLOS, supra note 34, arts. 297-98.
See id. art. 297.
See id. art. 298.
See id. art. 299.
See DSU, supra note 33 .
See id. arts. 4-5.
See id. art. 11.
See MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 205-08.
See DSU, supra note 33, art. 17(6).
See id. art. 17(14).
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The WTO dispute settlement system thus provides little flexibility as to procedures and mechanisms. Perhaps as a consequence, substantial discretion is
left to states elsewhere in the dispute settlement system. The remedy mechanism introduces considerable flexibility.
The possible remedies for violations of the covered trade agreements are
several, ranging from the offending state’s promptly bringing its practice into
compliance, to that state’s indicating that the practice will remain out of compliance “temporarily” (for an unspecified period) and then either paying compensation or doing nothing at all and standing subject to retorsion by the opposing state.46 More specifically, when a panel report or, in case of appeal, the
Appellate Body report holds that a state’s trade measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, the report must recommend that the measure be brought
into compliance.47 Within thirty days of adoption of that report, the state concerned must indicate its intentions relative to implementing that recommendation.48 In the event that the compliance recommendation is not implemented
within a reasonable period,49 the offending state is obliged to negotiate with the
complaining state “with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.”50 If no compensation arrangement has been agreed to within a reasonable
period, then the complaining state may request the DSB to authorize countermeasures.51 More precisely, the complaining state may request that the DSB
authorize suspension of the complaining state’s concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreement in relation to the state in default.52 By such a suspension of concessions and obligations, the complaining state is freed to take
countermeasures. Should the level of countermeasures permitted be disputed
by the offending state, then that level may be set by binding arbitration.53
The net result of such a suspension of concessions and obligations is, in a
sense, to return the disputing parties to a regime of diplomatic, nonadjudicatory dispute resolution relative to the specific issue in dispute. Certainly, that diplomatic process would proceed very much in the light of the fact
that the DSB had identified a violation and had authorized countermeasures.
But the dispute would have been returned, in that posture, for diplomatic resolution by the parties. In that way, even while the WTO dispute settlement system provides for compulsory third-party decisionmaking, the remedial mechanism is designed in such a way that, if an offending state chooses neither to
bring its practice into compliance nor to pay compensation, it may return the
dispute to the realm of diplomatic interstate dispute resolution. Thus, states
partially recover in the remedy provisions the discretion regarding methods of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. arts. 19-22.
See id. art. 19(1).
See id. art. 21.
Regarding determination of reasonable time periods, see id.
See id. art. 22(2).
See id. art. 22.
See id.
See id. art. 22(6).
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dispute resolution that they give up in the jurisdictional aspects of the WTO
dispute settlement system.
We should note also, before leaving our discussion of the WTO dispute settlement system, the national security exception in the WTO system. Article
XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which forms a major part
of the substantive law of the WTO, provides that
[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
54
and security.

Here we see, once again, that even when states are willing to grant some degree
of authority over settlement of interstate disputes to a third-party decisionmaker, military and security-related matters are frequently exempted from that
jurisdiction.
In looking at the relevant provisions of the ICJ Statute, UNCLOS, and the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, we have seen that each treaty provides to states considerable discretion over the degree and type of authority
that the respective courts will have over interstate disputes. The jurisdictional
provisions of the ICC Treaty, by contrast, provide for no such discretion.
Rather, the ICC Treaty provides that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the
national of any state when crimes within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
are alleged to have been committed on the territory of a state that has consented to the court’s jurisdiction.55
54. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXI, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
55. The ICC Treaty contains “admissibility” provisions that would deprive the ICC of the authority
to exercise its jurisdiction under certain circumstances. A case is not admissible before the ICC if
(a) [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) [t]he case has been investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and the state has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to prosecute.
ICC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 17(a), (b). But those admissibility provisions do not address the fact that
the state whose official acts are at issue may view those acts as lawful and, therefore, may see no basis
for investigation or prosecution. In addition, the treaty leaves undefined the type and extent of investigation required, the circumstances in which prosecution is required after investigation, and how much
information about the investigation (including potentially sensitive data) may be required to satisfy the
Court that the state has met its burden in demonstrating that it is neither unwilling nor unable to han-
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On the surface, the very easy explanation for this difference in the nature of
the ICC’s jurisdiction from that of other international courts is that the other
courts’ purpose is to adjudicate disputes between states while the ICC’s purpose
is to adjudicate the criminal liability of individuals. If individuals have committed the crimes of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, which the
community of states has already agreed are serious international crimes, then
their prosecution can hardly be likened to a dispute between states. This difference between the missions of the ICC and other international courts might be
thought entirely to justify the uniquely non-consensual basis of ICC jurisdiction.
To some extent, this explanation is cogent. For ICC cases concerned strictly
with individual culpability, the ICC will have much in common with municipal
criminal courts and relatively little in common with the other international
courts such as the ICJ. As noted earlier, however, a complexity arises from the
fact that, in addition to cases that are purely of the individual-culpability type,
the ICC also will hear cases in which official acts–acts that the state in question
maintains were lawful or whose very occurrence the state disputes–form the basis for an indictment.56 In such cases, the lawfulness of the official acts of states
will be adjudicated by the ICC. When the ICC is operating in this capacity, it
will have less in common with municipal criminal courts and a great deal in
common with other international courts such as the ICJ.
Since cases before the ICC will necessarily involve allegations of genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity,57 the subject matter of an ICC case of
the interstate-dispute type will likely be considered important and sensitive by
the involved states. The probable involvement of military activities would tend
to heighten the sensitive nature of the cases. And, given the relatively undeveloped state of the law in this field,58 the adjudicated outcome of such a dispute is
likely to be uncertain. Such disputes, then, are of precisely the sort that states
are most reluctant to submit for third-party adjudication.59 While the prerogative of states to choose whether to adjudicate such disputes is protected in the
ICJ Statute and other international court treaties, that prerogative has been
overlooked in the drafting of the ICC Treaty.
This oversight may be attributable in part to the drafters of the ICC Treaty’s
having viewed the ICC primarily in its capacity as a criminal court determining
individual guilt or innocence. Perhaps, in addition, some states wished to use
ICC jurisdiction to effectuate a change in interstate power relations by moving
an important category of interstate disputes out of the diplomatic realm and
dle the matter properly at the national level. Therefore, while the admissibility provisions do ameliorate the problems of ICC jurisdiction, those provisions do not adequately respond to the concerns arising from the ultimate fact that the ICC’s jurisdiction does not require that the defendant’s state of nationality be a party to the treaty or otherwise consent to ICC jurisdiction.
56. The two different types of cases that will come before the ICC may not appear as pure types;
any given case may have elements of each. For purposes of analysis, however, it will be useful to distinguish between cases of these two distinct characters.
57. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 74-81.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 5-17.
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into that of compulsory adjudication. As Arthur Rovine has noted, “weaker
states derive an obvious advantage from legal settlement in disputes with more
powerful opponents. . . . Clearly, the strong give up much of their leverage in a
contest of legal briefs and argumentation.”60 Or some participants in the ICC
negotiations may have wished to expand the power of international institutions,
including courts, without regard to the resultant redistribution of power among
particular states.
Whatever the motivating factors were, the failure to protect states’ prerogatives regarding jurisdiction over interstate disputes was bound to engender significant resistance to the ICC Treaty, some of which has already been manifested.61 In addition to these political consequences, the failure to retain states’
discretion regarding jurisdiction over interstate disputes also has legal implications that must be taken into account in any comprehensive analysis of the lawfulness of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals.
A number of theories have been advanced in support of the lawfulness of
ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals. While some of these theories have
considerable initial appeal, none ultimately provides a satisfactory foundation
for the form of jurisdiction claimed for the ICC. The shortcomings of these
theories, as we shall see, are largely attributable to the fact that the jurisdictional provisions and the theories offered in their support focus on ICC cases of
the individual-culpability type without attending to the legal implications of the
fact that the ICC will also adjudicate cases of the interstate-dispute variety.
III
THEORIES OF DELEGATED JURISDICTION
As reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,62 treaties
cannot “create . . . obligations” for non-parties.63 The United States has claimed
that the ICC Treaty, by providing for ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals,
violates this principle of the law of treaties.64 The United States may have stated
its complaint somewhat too simply. The ICC Treaty does not, per se, impose
“obligations” (in the sense of duties or responsibilities) on non-parties by providing for jurisdiction over their nationals.65
The legal objection to ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals is perhaps
better articulated as a claim that, by conferring upon the ICC jurisdiction over
non-party nationals, the ICC Treaty would abrogate the pre-existing rights of
non-parties which, in turn, would violate the law of treaties. As the International Law Commission’s official Commentaries on the Vienna Convention

60. Rovine, supra note 5, at 319.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 4 & 204.
62. Opened for signature May 23, 1969, arts. 34-38, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
63. See id. art. 34.
64. See supra text accompanying note 4.
65. See Philippe Kirsch, The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A Comment,
ASIL NEWSLETTER 1 (Nov./Dec. 1998).
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state, “[i]nternational tribunals have been firm in laying down that in principle
treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither impose obligations on States
which are not parties nor modify in any way their legal rights without their consent.”66 As Judge Huber stated succinctly in the Island of Palmas arbitration,
“whatever may be the right construction of a treaty, it cannot be interpreted as
disposing of the rights of independent third Powers.”67 ICC jurisdiction over
non-party nationals would appear to be exorbitant jurisdiction under international law, as shall be discussed below. The right of a state to be free from the
exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction over its nationals cannot be abrogated by a
treaty to which it is not a party.
The legal basis for objection to ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals
turns, then, on the proposition that such jurisdiction would be exorbitant under
the international law of jurisdiction. This proposition therefore requires careful
scrutiny. The first critical question will be whether the traditional bases for
states’ jurisdiction provide a legal foundation for ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals. If, for example, the jurisdiction to be exercised by the ICC
were the pre-existing jurisdiction of states parties which they had delegated to
the court, then, arguably, the ICC Treaty, far from conferring exorbitant jurisdiction, would be merely an agreement among the states parties regarding the
manner in which they would exercise their lawful jurisdiction. Two plausible
theories of ICC jurisdiction as delegated state jurisdiction will be examined
here: delegated universal jurisdiction and delegated territorial jurisdiction. After concluding that neither of those theories, nor, indeed, any of the traditional
bases for states’ jurisdiction, provides a legal foundation for ICC jurisdiction
over non-party nationals, we will then consider whether such jurisdiction would
nevertheless be lawful as a new form of jurisdiction.
A. Delegated Universal Jurisdiction
The ICC Treaty provides that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nonparty nationals, without consent by the state of nationality or referral by the Security Council, only if the alleged crime was committed on the territory of a
state party. Notwithstanding this territoriality requirement, some proponents of
the ICC Treaty have contended that ICC jurisdiction over the nationals of nonparty states is based, fundamentally, upon the principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant to which the courts of any state may prosecute the nationals of
any state for certain serious international crimes. Since any individual state
could prosecute perpetrators regardless of their nationality, they reason, a
66. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II YEARBOOK OF THE INT’L L. COMM’N 226 (1966)
(Commentary to Draft Art. 30, “General Rule Regarding Third states”) (emphasis added); see also
ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 321 (1961) (“A State which learns that a treaty concluded
between two other States has for its object or probable consequence the impairment of its rights,
whether enjoyed under customary international law or under a treaty with one of the contracting parties, is entitled at once to lodge a diplomatic protest with those parties and to apply to the International
Court of Justice . . . for a declaration and . . . for interim measures of protection.”).
67. Island of Palmas: 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 842.
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group of states may create an international court empowered to do the same.
Under this theory, each state party, in effect, delegates to the international
court its power to exercise universal jurisdiction. Advocates of this view reason
that the territoriality requirement simply reflects a choice that the ICC will exercise only part of the full range of jurisdiction that it legally could exercise under the customary law of universal jurisdiction.68
For ease of exposition, the theory of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals as delegated universal jurisdiction will be considered first, and the theory
based on delegated territorial jurisdiction will be considered below.
The theory of delegated universal jurisdiction as a basis for ICC jurisdiction
confronts two difficulties. The first is that the theory fails to account for the
ICC’s jurisdiction over a number of crimes that the Treaty places within the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC but which are not subject to universal jurisdiction. Certain violations of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,69
for instance, are not subject to universal jurisdiction under customary law.70 For
example, conscription of child soldiers, prohibited under Protocol I and elsewhere, is placed within the jurisdiction of the court by the terms of the ICC
Treaty,71 but is not a crime customarily subject to universal jurisdiction.72 A
delegated universal jurisdiction theory of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals thus would not account for jurisdiction over some of the crimes within
the jurisdiction of the court under the Treaty.
Perhaps the inclusion of crimes not customarily subject to universal jurisdiction should be viewed as a “proposal”, in effect, that customary law henceforth
68. As Professor Scharf puts it,
the drafters did not view the consent of the state of territoriality or nationality as necessary as
a matter of international law to confer jurisdiction on the court. Rather, they adopted the
consent regime as a limit to the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction as a politically expedient concession to the sovereignty of states in order to garner broad support for the statute.
Michael Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party states: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 77 (Winter 2001).
69. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
70. See Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 93, 102 (1999).
71. See ICC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8(xxvi).
72. The prohibition on recruitment of children under 15 years of age for service in armed forces,
and the obligation to take measures to ensure that such children do not participate in hostilities, appear
in the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions as well as in the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 69, art. 77(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 4(3)(c) 1125 U.N.T.S. 609;
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 38, 28 I.L.M. 1457. In none of those treaties
is there any suggestion that violations of the child soldier provisions constitute grave breaches or otherwise give rise to universal jurisdiction. Nor is there any other basis for a claim that utilization of child
soldiers constitutes an international crime entailing universal jurisdiction. See generally AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, CHILD SOLDIERS: ONE OF THE WORST ABUSES OF CHILD LABOR (1999) (reviewing
international legal prohibitions on utilization of child soldiers); ILENE COHN & GUY GOODWIN, CHILD
SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 55-72 (1994).
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recognize those crimes as giving rise to universal jurisdiction.73 If this proposed
extension of universal jurisdiction meets with broad consent, then the law will
change accordingly and this particular flaw in a universal-jurisdiction theory of
ICC jurisdiction will, in time, be eliminated. Even if all that comes to pass,
however, a theory of delegated universal jurisdiction would nevertheless face a
much more fundamental obstacle.
The fundamental problem with reliance on universal jurisdiction as a basis
for ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals turns on the question whether
universal jurisdiction may be delegated to an international court. The proposition that the universal jurisdiction of states is delegable to an international entity warrants examination.
1. The Significance of Delegation. The delegation of states’ universal
jurisdiction to an international court would fundamentally alter the
consequences of that jurisdiction.
The exercise of delegated universal
jurisdiction by an international court would have very different implications,
involving a different set of state interests, than would the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by a state. Because the consequences of universal jurisdiction
would be fundamentally transformed by the delegation itself, consent to the
universal jurisdiction of states should not be considered equivalent to consent to
the delegation of universal jurisdiction to an international court.
Customary international law evolves as a reflection of the consent or acquiescence of states over time. Because consent to universal jurisdiction exercised
by states is not equivalent to consent to delegated universal jurisdiction exercised by an international court, the customary law affirming the universal jurisdiction of states cannot be considered equivalent to customary law affirming the
delegability of that jurisdiction to an international court.
There are sound reasons for which a state, even while accepting universal
jurisdiction, might wish to reject the delegation of such jurisdiction for exercise
by an international court. A state might reject compulsory third-party adjudication before the ICC in order to retain the discretion to address interstatedispute type cases through bilateral relations, even while recognizing the possibility that those bilateral relations might in some cases entail the prosecution of
that state’s national in another state’s courts under universal jurisdiction. The
reasons for which states might prefer bilateral relations to third-party adjudication in interstate disputes involving international criminal law are essentially the
same as the reasons, discussed earlier, for which states are generally reluctant to
submit their interstate disputes to third-party adjudication.
As observed earlier, while the most blatant instances of genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity leave nothing to dispute or negotiate, many
cases involving allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity, or, especially,
war crimes concern issues of unsettled law or ambiguous facts, or both. In such
73. The status of the ICC Treaty as generating customary law will be considered below. See infra
Part IVB.
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cases, states may have legitimate reasons for preferring mechanisms other than
binding adjudication.
States value the advantages that diplomatic methods of dispute settlement
often afford. Particularly where an interstate dispute concerns an area of unsettled law, litigation may entail more risk than states can be expected to accept. If
the subject matter is important and the law is unsettled, allowing a third party
to, in effect, decide the binding law of the matter is a very perilous course of action. Cases involving highly contested facts also entail obvious risks. States
may, therefore, perceive a number of drawbacks associated with compulsory
adjudication before the ICC.
First, compromise outcomes of various sorts may be desirable in interstatedispute type cases, especially in circumstances where the law or the facts are
ambiguous. But compromise outcomes are unlikely to emerge from adjudicated rather than negotiated resolutions.
Second, states would have reason to be more concerned about the political
impact of adjudications before an international court than before an individual
states’ courts. An even-remotely successful international court will have significant prestige and authority. The political repercussions of such a court’s determining that a state’s acts or policies were unlawful would be substantial indeed,
and categorically different from the repercussion of the same verdict rendered
by a national court. If a guilty verdict were passed by a national court in an official-acts case, the matter would remain a disagreement among equals, one
state maintaining that an unlawful act had been committed, the other disputing
its occurrence or defending its lawfulness. By contrast, were the ICC to pronounce an official act to constitute a crime, the decision would bear an authoritative weight and resulting political impact of a categorically different nature.
The special political impact of ICC decisions will itself create heightened risks
for states. It may also create situations in which states will be put to a choice of
either revealing sensitive data as defense evidence or withholding that evidence
and thereby risking severe political costs in case of a guilty verdict.
A third matter that may be of substantial concern to states is the role of an
international criminal court in shaping the law. Because the decisions of an international court will tend to be more authoritative than would those of any individual state’s courts, an international court would have the power to create international law in a manner disproportionate to that of any state. This may be
more law-making power than some states are comfortable granting to one international institution, especially in sensitive areas involving military activities
and international security.
Because the law of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity74 is
still very much in formation, the issue of law-making power is particularly important in this context. Controversial and politically significant issues remain
open, and major new questions continue to emerge. Reflecting the developing
74. I leave aside the crime of aggression, which is not, for the time being, within the effective jurisdiction of the ICC. See supra note 2.
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state of the law in this field, the appellate chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (“ICTY/R”) has on more
than one occasion reversed a trial chamber decision on a basic point of law.
Developments in the Tadic case illustrate the point. The “grave breaches”
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for universal jurisdiction
over certain crimes when those crimes are committed in international armed
conflicts.75 Article 2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) provides that “[t]he international tribunal
shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely
the following acts . . . .”76 The ICTY trial chamber held in Tadic that, when acts
defined as grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions are committed against
persons or property categorized as protected under the Geneva Conventions,
such conduct may be prosecuted before the ICTY regardless of whether the acts
were committed in an international armed conflict. According to the trial
chamber, Article 2 of the ICTY Statute
has been so drafted as to be self-contained rather than referential, save for the identification of the victims of enumerated acts; that identification and that alone involves
going to the Conventions themselves for the definition of “persons or property protected” . . . .
[T]he requirement of international conflict does not appear on the face of Article
2. . . .
[T]here is no ground for treating Article 2 as in effect importing into the Statute
the whole of the terms of the Conventions, including the reference in common Article
77
2 of the Geneva Convention[s] to international conflicts. . . .

The ICTY appellate chamber rejected that holding, stating:
With all due respect, the Trial Chamber’s reasoning is based on a misconception of
the grave breaches provisions and the extent of their incorporation into the Statute of
the International Tribunal. . . . The international armed conflict requirement was a
necessary limitation on the grave breaches system in light of the intrusion on state
sovereignty that such mandatory universal jurisdiction represents. State parties to the
1949 Geneva conventions did not want to give other states jurisdiction over serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in their internal armed conflicts–at least not the mandatory universal jurisdiction involved in the grave breaches
system.

75. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 2, 49, 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114 75 U.N.T.S 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 2, 50, 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217 75 U.N.T.S 85; Geneva Convention
III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 2, 129, 130, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts.
2, 146, 147, 75 U.N.T.S 287.
76. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, in Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
77. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1T, decision of Aug. 10, 1995, ¶¶ 49-51.
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[T]he Trial Chamber has misinterpreted the reference to the Geneva Conventions
contained in the sentence of Article 2: “persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Conventions.” . . . Clearly, these provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to persons or objects protected only to the extent that they
78
are caught up in an international armed conflict. . . .

The appellate chamber thus reversed the trial court on a very basic question
of international criminal law. The trial chamber was prepared to treat the international-conflict requirement as merely incidental to the Geneva Conventions’ definition of grave breaches. The appellate chamber ruled that the trial
court’s holding misconceived the limited nature of the consent to universal jurisdiction given by the states parties to the Geneva Conventions. Such issues, of
great significance going to the very basis of the legitimacy of international
criminal law, are only now in the process of being decided, as the Tadic appeal
demonstrates.
Appellate reversals of trial chamber decisions on major legal issues such as
that in the Tadic case and in other cases before the ICTY/R79 indicate that this is
an area of law in formation and in which there will be disagreements among experts about the content of the law. It is therefore likely that one state might
take a different view of the legality of a particular act or policy than would another state or an international court.
There are, of course, disagreements about the content of the law in domestic
settings; and appellate courts reverse trial chambers’ decisions in domestic judi78. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, decision of Oct. 2, 1995, ¶¶ 80-83 [hereinafter Tadic Appeal].
79. Another example of the ICTY/R’s addressing major and unsettled legal questions through the
process of trial and appeal concerns a defendant’s right to counsel. Jean-Paul Akayesu was an indigent
defendant indicted for genocide and other crimes before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”). See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber decision of Sept. 2, 1998. After dismissing a number of lawyers assigned for his defense, Akayesu decided
that he wanted the Canadian lawyer, Jean Philpot, to represent him. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Decision Relating to the Assignment of Counsel, decision of
July 27, 1999. At Akayesu’s request, Philpot was placed on the list of available counsel that is maintained by the ICTR registrar, see id., but the registrar subsequently refused Akayesu’s request to be
represented by Philpot. See id. The registrar’s refusal was upheld by the ICTR trial chamber on the
ground that too great a proportion of the counsel appointed by the ICTR were French or Canadian.
See At a Genocide Trial, French is a Handicap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at A11. That trial chamber
decision was reversed on appeal in a very narrow opinion tied closely to the facts of the case:
[T]he practice of the Tribunal has been to provide a list of approved counsel from which an
accused may choose. . . . Mr. Philpot was included in this list by the Registrar upon the insistence of the Appellant that he desired that Mr. Philpot be assigned to him . . . . [T]he Registrar thereby gave the Appellant a legitimate expectation that Mr. Philpot would be assigned to
represent him before the Tribunal.
Akeyesu Appeals Chamber Decision, supra, at 3.
By basing its holding narrowly on Akayesu’s legitimate expectations in the particular circumstances
of the case, the appellate chamber chose not to address the broad issues that the case raised regarding
the right to defense counsel and, in particular, the proper balancing of the defendant’s interest in choice
of counsel with the United Nations’ interest in geographical representativeness of its personnel. These
broader implications of the case were addressed in a number of petitions submitted to the Appellate
Chamber. See, e.g., Petition for the Intervention as Amicus Curiae, of the International Criminal Defense Attorneys Association, filed on April 28, 1999. The Akayesu Defense Counsel case thus represents another major question in international criminal law which has come before the ICTY/R, but in
this case, the substance of the matter remains to be addressed.
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cial systems. This is precisely what makes the structure of the judiciary a crucial
feature of states’ constitutional designs. What is at issue in the ICC context is
whether the judicial structure being proposed–which will then play an inevitably
influential role in shaping the law–is acceptable to those who have been asked
to join in constituting and accepting the jurisdiction of that judicial power.
The law developed by the ICC will not be susceptible to revision or modification through any legislative process. In municipal justice systems, if the court
gets it wrong, the legislature provides a safety valve. There is no such recourse
relative to the ICC.80 States may have legitimate concerns about the compulsory
jurisdiction of such a court; they may not see fit to have an international tribunal in effect legislate international law in areas where the law is relatively undeveloped. States might have sound reasons for preferring to retain more direct
control, diffused among many states, over the shaping of international law in
this critical field rather than to relegate a substantial proportion of that control
to a single international entity.
States are keenly interested that the law in this field should develop in directions that are consistent with their views of international relations, with the extent and nature of their military engagements, as well as with their visions of
what would provide the greatest justice and deterrence value. The development of international criminal law, like the development of other areas of international law, is a process of state consent, agreement, and acquiescence. Its development is, in that respect, a series of more or less directly negotiated
outcomes in an incremental process. A state might be concerned about granting jurisdiction to an international court that inevitably would have great influence, disproportionate to that of any state, in the formation of that body of
law.81
In the ways just described, the consequences and implications of ICC jurisdiction are materially different from those of national jurisdiction. These differences are sufficiently significant so that the customary international law of
universal jurisdiction should not be quickly presumed to entail the delegability
of that jurisdiction from states to an international court. Because different
states’ interests are affected by the two forms of jurisdiction, consent to or acquiescence in one is not equivalent to consent to or acquiescence in the other.
80. The Assembly of States Parties, by the terms of the ICC Treaty, will provide only a rather
minimal form of oversight of the Court’s operations. See ICC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 112 (establishing an Assembly of States Parties with oversight functions relative to the ICC).
81. States may reasonably have significant concerns about ICC jurisdiction not only with regard to
official-acts cases but also in relation to cases of the individual-culpability type. In individualculpability cases, the concerns will relate primarily to diplomatic protection. If a state finds it necessary
to provide diplomatic protection to ensure just treatment of a national who is facing prosecution, that
state may confront significant disadvantages in interacting with the ICC rather than with another state.
In a sense, the need to provide diplomatic protection to ensure just treatment of a national in an individual-culpability case transforms that case, or at least the aspect of it involving the diplomaticprotection issue, into a dispute between the state of the defendant’s nationality and the prosecuting
authority. Where that dispute is with a state, bilateral diplomatic methods may be employed. Where
that authority is an international court, the nature of the dispute resolution process would be entirely
different. Indeed, no process for the resolution of such disputes with the ICC has been articulated.
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The arguments, frequently offered as a response to concerns about ICC jurisdiction, that the ICC would address only very grave crimes, that the ICC
prosecutor would be a person of distinction and fine judgment, and that the
ICC is not intended to interfere in the affairs of basically law abiding states, do
not adequately respond to the fundamental concerns that states may have. Reactions to the NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrate that the arguments offered are beside the point.
Some NATO military actions during the armed conflict in Kosovo were
characterized as war crimes by a number of distinguished international lawyers
and political actors.82 South African Minister of Education (formerly Minister
of Water Affairs and Forestry) Kader Asmal stated in July 1999 that NATO’s
“bombing of water resources in [the Kosovo campaign] is a war crime.”83 On
May 10, 1999, international law professor Ian Brownlie argued on behalf of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the ICJ that the NATO action was in
violation of international law for reasons including “the unlawful modalities of
the aerial bombardment.”84 On the same day, lawyers from several countries
filed a complaint with the ICTY prosecutor against NATO officials and leaders
of NATO member states for alleged war crimes committed in NATO’s armed
intervention in Yugoslavia.85 ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour subsequently indicated that she would investigate those charges.86 All of these statements were
made by persons of judgment and distinction. Each was a person who would be
a credible candidate for office within the ICC. One need not assume that the
ICC would act unreasonably or abusively to envision that any state’s action,
viewed by that state as lawful, could someday become the subject of an ICC
prosecution.
There is an aspect of some of the arguments favoring prosecutions for
NATO actions that bears particular notice in this respect. Professor Michael
Byers, for example, suggested that, if indeed war crimes had been committed in
the NATO action, it would be particularly important to prosecute those crimes
in order to demonstrate the evenhandedness of the ICTY.87 Such an approach
would be consistent with prior ICTY prosecutorial strategy in which, for example, one stated purpose for indictment of a number of Croats at the particular
time they were indicted was to dispel Serbian suspicions that the ICTY was

82. I leave aside here the legality of the NATO military intervention itself because the crime of aggression is not currently within effective ICC jurisdiction as framed by the ICC Treaty. See supra note
2.
83. Alex Kirby, Kosovo Waterways Bombing a “War Crime” (visited Mar. 22, 2000)
<http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid_394000/394326.stm>.
84. Ian Brownlie, Co-Agent for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Remarks before the ICJ in the
Case Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (May 10, 1999) (on file with author).
85. See Bruce Zagaris, Complaint Before War Crimes Tribunal Charges NATO Leaders with War
Crimes, 15 INT’L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 249 (1999).
86. See Burden of Proof (CNN television broadcast, June 1, 1999).
87. Interview with Michael Byers, The World Tonight (BBC Radio 4 radio broadcast, May 28,
1999).
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anti-Serb.88 If this view regarding the place of “evenhandedness” in international prosecutorial strategy is applied by the ICC, then it could become even
more likely that the actions of non-“rogue” states would become the subject of
ICC prosecutions.
Thus, even if the ICC will prosecute only grave crimes, will have a distinguished prosecutor with fine judgment, and will not interfere in the affairs of
basically law abiding states, this does not mean that the actions of any given
state could never realistically become the subject of ICC prosecutions. Therefore, the question whether ICC jurisdiction is acceptable to a given state must
be evaluated on the assumption that ICC jurisdiction may actually be applied.
We have seen that the consequences of universal jurisdiction exercised by a
state are significantly different from the consequences of delegated universal jurisdiction exercised by an international court. For that reason, consent to
states’ exercise of universal jurisdiction is not equivalent to consent to the delegation of universal jurisdiction to an international court. By extension, customary law supporting the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states is not equivalent to customary law supporting the delegation of states’ universal jurisdiction
to an international court. Therefore, we may not simply assume that states’
universal jurisdiction may be delegated to an international court as a matter of
customary international law. Rather, the question requires analysis.
2. The Content of Custom. As we have seen, there are comprehensible and
even good reasons for which a state might object to the delegation of states’
universal jurisdiction to the ICC. We turn now to a closer examination of the
legal status of such objections.
Universal jurisdiction arises as a matter of customary international law.89 If,
by custom, universal jurisdiction were delegable to an international court, then
states would be obliged to accept such delegation and, by extension, to accept
ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals. If, however, delegation of universal
jurisdiction to an international court would constitute an innovation beyond the
customary meaning of universal jurisdiction, then the legal status of jurisdiction
based on such delegation would remain to be determined. The initial question,
then, is whether the customary international law of universal jurisdiction, as it
has developed through state practice and opinio juris, entails the possibility of
delegation to an international court.
State practice relating to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by an international court has been limited. The ICTY/R are believed by some to found their
jurisdiction on the delegated universal jurisdiction of states.90 However, as the
88. Conversation of author with Richard Goldstone, then-Prosecutor, ICTY/R, in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996).
89. Cf. infra Part IVA (regarding the notion of universal jurisdiction created by treaty).
90. See, e.g., REVISED REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ¶¶ 72-73, U.N Doc. A/CN.4/L.490 and Add.1 (1993); Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT
MILLENIUM 17-37 (Michael Schmitt & Leslie Green eds., 1998).
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ICTY/R are products of U.N. Security Council action under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter,91 the tribunals’ jurisdiction is more properly viewed as arising
from the powers of the Security Council to take such steps as are required to restore or maintain international peace and security. In responding to jurisdictional challenges going to the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY and
ICTR, each tribunal has responded by affirming the power of the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII, to establish a judicial tribunal as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security and has cited that
Security Council power as forming the jurisdictional foundation of the tribunal.92 Neither tribunal has invoked delegated universal jurisdiction or any other
form of universal jurisdiction as the basis of its jurisdiction.93
91. See U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993) and U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
3453d mtg. (1994) (specifying that, in establishing the ICTY and ICTR, respectively, the Security
Council was acting under Chapter VII).
92. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 78, at 5-24; Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, ICTR, Decision on
the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, June 18, 1997, ¶¶ 7-29.
In April 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) brought suit before the ICJ accusing ten
NATO countries of violating international obligations to refrain from the use of force against another
state. See ICJ, Press Communiqué 99/39, July 2, 1999 (visited Mar. 22, 2000) <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
Several of those NATO respondents, including the United States, challenged the FRY’s right to bring
suit under the ICJ’s optional-clause jurisdiction on the basis that the FRY was not a member of the
United Nations. See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. Public Sitting CR99/16 ¶ 10 (statement of Philippe Kirsch, Agent of Canada) (visited Mar. 22, 2000), <http://www.icj-cij.org/icj/idocket/iyall/iyall_iyca_icr9916_ 19990510.htlm>.
To support the claim that the FRY was not a U.N. member, the respondents made reference to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 777 of 1992 and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 47/1 of 1992. See id. ¶
11. The FRY argued, in response, that those resolutions excluded the FRY only from occupying its
seat in the General Assembly but not from other participation in the U.N. system. The ICJ declined
the FRY’s request for provisional measures in the case, but did so on other grounds without addressing
the U.N-membership issue. See ICJ, Press Communiqué, supra.
These circumstances raise the question of what authority the ICTY has in the FRY in light of the
fact that the ICTY’s jurisdiction and other authority arises from U.N. Security Council action. If the
FRY is not a U.N. member (and already was not a member as of 1992 when the two relevant U.N.
resolutions were adopted), then, one could argue, the ICTY (which was established in 1993) has no
powers in the FRY and no jurisdiction over FRY nationals.
There are a number of appropriate responses to this set of circumstances. First, we must recognize
that the status of the FRY relative to the United Nations is not settled. If the FRY’s own position on
this matter prevails, then the FRY is indeed a U.N. member and, perforce, bound by the Security
Council action establishing the ICTY (notwithstanding the FRY’s own protests, on other grounds, to
ICTY jurisdiction). See Letter from the Charge d’affaires, a.i., of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations (May 19, 1993) (U.N.
Doc. A/48/170-S/25801 (1993)). Given that the FRY’s mission to the U.N. has continued to exist and to
receive official U.N. communications, that the FRY flag has continued to fly outside U.N. headquarters, and other indicia of U.N. membership, it is not entirely farfetched that the FRY would be found to
hold membership.
If on the other hand, the FRY were found to be a non-member of the U.N., then the question
whether the U.N. Charter is binding on non-parties would be directly posed. Regarding this debate,
see infra text accompanying notes 150-167. If the charter were found to be binding in a robust way on
non-parties, then the ICTY would maintain its powers in the FRY. If, however, the charter were found
not to be binding on non-members in the relevant respects, then this would have far-reaching and profound consequences, quite possibly among them the loss of the ICTY’s powers within the FRY and jurisdiction over FRY nationals.
93. By contrast, the ICTY has made reference to the principles underlying universal jurisdiction in
justifying the primacy of the ICTY over national courts (the concept of primacy is not adopted by the
ICC Treaty) and in justifying prosecution of defendants before the international forum rather than be-
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The other international criminal tribunals that some view as precedents for
the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction are the International Military
Tribunal (“Nuremberg tribunal”) and the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (“Tokyo tribunal”) established in the aftermath of World War II
(“WWII”).94 But, in fact, neither the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo tribunal based
its competence on the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction. Rather, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals each, in different ways, based their jurisdiction
on the consent of the state of nationality of the defendants.
This is not to say that those WWII tribunals were right to have based their
jurisdiction on the consent of the defendants’ states of nationality. Strong arguments have been made that the claimed jurisdictional basis was flawed by the
coerced nature of the consent.95 But, even if the jurisdiction of those tribunals
were flawed by the coerced nature of the consent, that would mean nothing
more than that the jurisdiction was flawed. It would not imply that the tribunals’ jurisdiction had rested on some other basis, such as collective exercise of
universal jurisdiction.
In the case of the Tokyo tribunal, the Japanese government (which, at least
formally, retained sovereign power in Japan after the war) acceded, in the Instrument of Surrender,96 to prosecution of Japanese nationals before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The Instrument of Surrender states
that the Japanese government accepts the provisions set forth in the Potsdam
Declaration of July 26, 1945,97 and agrees to “take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to
that Declaration.”98 The Potsdam Declaration, in turn, provides that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals.”99 The Potsdam Declaration further
states that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out.100 The Cairo
Declaration included the statement that “[t]he . . . allies are fighting this war to
restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.”101 The primacy of the Instrument
of Surrender, read together with the two Declarations, in constituting Japan’s
fore their “natural” (national) fora. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 78, at 32-33 (primacy), 34 (“natural
forum”). The ICTY has not, however, stated or in any way implied that universal jurisdiction formed
the basis for its jurisdiction.
94. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, The Prosecution of War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 26
BRACTON L.J. 13, 16 (1994) (Nuremberg tribunal).
95. See, e.g., R. JOHN PRITCHARD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE
TOKYO WAR TRIAL 8-10 (1987) [hereinafter PRITCHARD, AN OVERVIEW] (regarding Tokyo); cf.
Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT’L L.
518, 523 (1945) (noting that the Allies did not afford German citizens political rights and representation).
96. Sept. 2, 1945, 3 Bevans 1251.
97. 3 Bevans 1204; see Instrument of Surrender, supra note 96, at 1251.
98. Instrument of Surrender, supra note 96, at 1252.
99. Potsdam Declaration, supra note 97, at 1205, ¶ 10.
100. See id. ¶ 8.
101. Communiqué, First Cairo Conference, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 858; see also PRITCHARD, supra
note 95, at 9; R. John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its Contemporary Resonances, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 27-28 (1995) [hereinafter, Pritchard, The International Tribunal].
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consent and, thereby, forming the jurisdictional basis for the Tokyo tribunal, is
affirmed both in the Tokyo tribunal’s charter and in its judgment.102
With regard to the Nuremberg tribunal, the story is more complex. The
four Allied states that established the Nuremberg tribunal had taken on supreme authority in Germany. As stated in the Berlin Declaration of June 5,
1945,
[t]he Governments of the United States of America, The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the
powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state,
103
municipal, or local government or authority.

In that position, the Allies exercised judicial and all other powers of sovereignty
in Germany. At a minimum, the Allies, acting in their capacity as the effective
German sovereign, consented to the prosecution of German nationals at the
Nuremberg tribunal. A more robust, and perhaps more accurate, reading
would be that the Nuremberg tribunal prosecutions were actually an exercise of
national jurisdiction by the effective German sovereign, the Allies. In either
case, the effective German sovereign consented to the prosecutions.
One may debate whether the Allies were the German sovereign in 1945 or
merely stood in loco sovereigntis. Clearly, the Allies stood in a position essentially different from that of mere occupiers.104 There has been no disagreement
102. See PRITCHARD, AN OVERVIEW, supra note 95, at 9 n.16 (citing Proceedings, Vol. 20; Judgment, T.48415-19, and Annex A-1 - A-5); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 4, 13 (1945) (“Japan, by her
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and her surrender, has acquiesced in the trials of those guilty of
violations of the law of war.”); John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and
its Contemporary Resonances: A General Preface to the Collection, in THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR
CRIMES TRIAL xxxi (J. Pritchard ed., 1998).
103. Berlin Declaration, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, 1650; see also Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany, Sept. 20, 1945, 3 Bevans 1254 (delineating further the powers to be
exercised by the Allies including prosecutions for war crimes).
104. As Fritz Mann reasoned at that time,
to place the City of Koenigsberg and the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line under Soviet
and Polish administration respectively far exceed the limits within which a mere belligerent
occupant could act, no belligerent occupant could withdraw diplomatic missions or require
“German authorities and all persons in Germany” to hand over all gold, silver and platinum,
or acquire the right to have placed “at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives”
the entire German shipping and the whole of the German inland transport system. And if one
looks at the legislation of the Control Council, one finds Law No. 4 about the reorganisation
of the German judicial system . . . .
The Allies’ failure to exercise the qualified rights of a belligerent occupant seems to be
undeniable. . . . The material question is why the Allies have an internationally recognisable
right to behave otherwise than as belligerent occupants. . . .
Although neither the end of hostilities nor the unconditional surrender nor the disappearance of a central government could, in themselves, have entitled the Allied Governments to
adopt an attitude other than that of a belligerent occupant, it is, in the peculiar situation of
Germany in 1945, the co-existence of these three facts which provides an internationally recognisable justification for Allied action. The rules relating to belligerent occupation seek to
establish a compromise between military necessities and the interests of the inhabitants. . . .
They expect, from both sides, a standard of conduct which becomes impracticable when every
single activity of the occupied state expresses a doctrine the eradication of which is the very
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as to whether the Allies’ position in post-war Germany exceeded the traditional
bounds of occupation. Rather, debate focused on whether the Allies were actually the sovereign(s) in post-war Germany or only stood in the place of the
sovereign. Fritz Mann took the position that the Allies, while not having assumed territorial sovereignty, nevertheless assumed governmental sovereignty
and, thus, occupied the status of the Government of Germany. As he wrote,
from the point of view of international law Germany is a dependent state. . . . The position of the Allied Governments probably is that they exercise what certain publicists
have described as co-imperium. While in the case of a condominium a community of
states has sovereignty over a territory belonging to them jointly, a co-imperium exists,
if several states jointly exercise jurisdiction or governmental functions and powers in
105
territory belonging to another state. . . .

Georg Schwarzenberger argued that the Allies were co-sovereigns of Germany and that they conducted the Nuremberg tribunal in that capacity. In his
words,
by deballatio, [the Allies] became the joint sovereigns of Germany. Little importance
need, therefore, be attached to the circumstance that the joint sovereigns exercised
their jurisdiction as the fountain of law and justice in Germany by an international
treaty; for this mode of co-ordinating their sovereign wills is not so much determined
by the object of their joint deliberations as by the character of the joint sovereigns as
four distinct subjects of international law. As the Tribunal stated in its judgment,
there would have been little doubt regarding the municipal character of the Tribunal if
one state alone had overrun Germany and established such a tribunal, instead of four
victorious Powers combining their efforts towards the same end: “The Signatory
Power created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what
any of them might have done singly.” [Citing the Nuremberg Judgment, infra note
111.] . . . Furthermore, in accordance with Article 29 of the Tribunal’s Charter, the
right of pardon rests with the Control Council for Germany. In substance, therefore,
the Tribunal is a municipal tribunal of extraordinary jurisdiction which the four Con106
tracting Powers share in common.

Hans Kelsen also took the view that the Allies had the right to conduct the
Nuremberg tribunal based on their position as German sovereign. As he said,
the criminal prosecution of Germans for illegal acts of their state could have been
based on national law, enacted for this purpose by the competent authorities. These
authorities were the four occupant powers exercising their joint sovereignty in a condominium over the territory and the population of subjugated Germany through the
107
Control Council as the legitimate successor of the last German Government.

aim of the war. . . . No German Government could have been formed to co-operate with a
mere belligerent occupant. If the Allies had assumed only the role of belligerent occupants,
they and the United Nations in whose interests they act, could not achieve their war aims,
which go far beyond military victory; indeed, they would have failed to fulfil their duty and
historic mission. It is the unique character of the circumstances which required and sanctioned a unique solution, a new departure.
Fritz A. Mann, The Present Legal Status of Germany, 1 INT’L L. Q. 314, 321-23 (1947).
105. Mann, supra note 104, at 330.
106. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 263, 290, 291 (1950); see also Georg Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L.
REV. 329, 334-35 (1947).
107. Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International
Law?, 1 INT’L L. Q. 153, 167 (1947). Kelsen, however, went on to reason (in a manner of particular in-
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We may conclude, at a minimum, that the Nuremberg tribunal, having acted
with the consent of the Allies, acted with the consent of the effective sovereign
of the defendants’ state of nationality. It may also be that, beyond merely consenting to the Nuremberg tribunal prosecutions, the Allies actually created the
tribunal and conducted those prosecutions in their capacity as effective sovereign. Indeed, this is the view reflected in the Judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal, which states: “[T]he making of the Charter [establishing the Nuremberg
tribunal] was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to
which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right
of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized
by the civilized world.”108
The jurisdictional basis of the Nuremberg tribunal was not delineated, in the
tribunal’s charter or judgment, with greater precision. While the language
quoted above is strong evidence that the Nuremberg tribunal based its jurisdiction on the consent of the Allies as effective German sovereign, an alternative
theory, that the Nuremberg tribunal based its jurisdiction on universal jurisdiction, has attained some currency over the years. The passage from the U.N.
Secretary General’s 1949 Report on the Nuremberg tribunal, from which this
theory may have garnered some of its force, begins by quoting the same sentence from the Nuremberg judgment quoted immediately above. It then goes
on to say:
In this statement the Court refers to the particular legal situation arising out of the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945, and the declaration issued in Berlin
on 5 June 1945, by the four Allied states, signatories of the London Agreement. By
this declaration the said countries assumed supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High
Command and any state, municipal or local government or authority. The Court apparently held that in virtue of these acts the sovereignty of Germany had passed into
the hands of the four states and that these countries thereby were authorized under international law to establish the Tribunal and invest it with the power to try and punish
the major German war criminals.
The Court, however, also indicated another basis for its jurisdiction, a basis of
more general scope. “The Signatory Powers” [the Tribunal said], “created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct
of the trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might have
done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law.” The statement is far from clear, but, with some hesitation, the following alternative interpretations may be offered. It is possible that the
Court meant that the several signatory Powers had jurisdiction over the crimes defined in the Charter because these crimes threatened the security of each of them.
The Court may, in other words, have intended to assimilate the said crimes, in regard
to jurisdiction, to such offences as the counterfeiting of currency. On the other hand,
it is also possible and perhaps more probable, that the Court considered the crimes
terest for our question of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals) that if, as he believed was the case,
the Allies did not exercise jurisdiction based on their sovereignty in Germany but rather attempted to
represent the Nuremberg tribunal as an international tribunal, then its jurisdiction was illegitimate precisely because it lacked the consent of non-parties to the London Agreement, the treaty that formed
the basis of the Nuremberg tribunal’s jurisdiction. See id. at 168.
108. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Sept. 30, 1946, reprinted in RICHARD A. FALK
ET AL., CRIMES OF WAR 96 (1971).
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under the Charter to be, as international crimes, subject to the jurisdiction of every
state. The case of piracy would then be the appropriate parallel. This interpretation
seems to be supported by the fact that the Court affirmed that the signatory Powers in
creating the Tribunal had made use of a right belonging to any nation. But it must be
conceded, at the same time, that the phrase “right thus to set up special courts to ad109
minister law” is too vague to admit of definite conclusions.

The Secretary General was right to be wary of drawing, from that passage in
the Nuremberg judgment, the conclusion that the Nuremberg tribunal’s jurisdiction was based on the protective principle (the reference to counterfeiting)
or on the universality principle (the reference to piracy). Rather, the assertion
in the Nuremberg Judgment that, in establishing the Nuremberg tribunal, the
Allies had “done together what any one of them might have done singly”110 is
equally applicable to a sovereign-consent theory as to a universal-jurisdiction
theory of that tribunal’s jurisdiction. Indeed, read together with the passage of
the judgment which states that “the making of the Charter was the exercise of
the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered,”111 the meaning seems more consistent with the view
that the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribunal rested on the effective sovereign
powers of the Allies to prosecute or consent to the prosecution of German nationals.
These considerations have not precluded the occasional assertion that the
Nuremberg tribunal rested its competence on the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction. For example, the U.N. Commission of Experts on the former
Yugoslavia made the claim that,
states may choose to combine their jurisdictions under the universality principle and
vest this combined jurisdiction in an international tribunal. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal may be said to have derived its jurisdiction from such a combination of the national jurisdiction of the states Parties to the London Agreement set112
ting up that Tribunal.

For this assertion, the commission provided no support whatsoever. In light of
the evidence that the Nuremberg tribunal rested its jurisdiction on the exercise
of effective sovereignty by the Allies or, at a minimum, on the consent of that
effective sovereign, quite substantial evidence, which does not appear to exist,
would be required to uphold the commission’s claim.
The warranted conclusion appears to be that the jurisdictional basis of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals was not the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction but, rather, the consent of the defendants’ states of nationality. With
regard to Tokyo, this conclusion is uncontroversial. Regarding Nuremberg,
what must be said, at a minimum, is that the tribunal rested its jurisdiction
109. SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS at 80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, U.N. Sales No.
1949V.7 (1949).
110. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 461 (S. Paul A. Joosten ed., 1948).
111. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 108, at 96.
112. Interim Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, 1992, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
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largely on the fact that the Allies as effective sovereign in post-war Germany
consented to the trial of German nationals.113
Based on the evidence regarding the jurisdictional bases of the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals, those tribunals cannot be relied upon as state practice
providing precedent for the delegation of universal jurisdiction to an international court. Nor, as discussed above, do the ICTY/R represent such precedents. None of the four international criminal tribunals that have been established to date, then, provides evidence that the customary international law of
universal jurisdiction encompasses the option of delegation to an international
criminal court. Nor are there alternative sources of law to be relied on to that
effect.114
113. One certainly may question whether the Allies should have acted in loco sovereigntis in postwar Germany. Concerns could be raised as to whether the Allies were sufficiently interested in the
welfare of the German population to act as the German sovereign. In this regard, see Kelsen, supra
note 95, at 523 (“[t]he occupant state . . . will not confer upon the former citizens of the occupied state
political rights with respect to its own legislative or executive organs . . . . ”). Conducting or consenting
to war-crimes prosecutions at the Nuremberg tribunal could be among the points of concern. But the
questions of the wisdom and legitimacy of Allied government in post-war Germany need not be resolved in order to acknowledge that precisely such a government did exist. In the position of sovereign
or acting sovereign, the Allies fulfilled the role of the government of Germany and, in that capacity,
conducted or consented to the prosecution of German nationals by the Nuremberg tribunal.
114. It has occasionally been suggested that the Genocide Convention or the Apartheid Convention
provides support for the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction over non-party nationals. Neither
convention, however, provides such support.
The Genocide Convention provides for jurisdiction by the territorial state “or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties as shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added). It thus does not envision that the court would have jurisdiction with respect to non-contracting parties. The international tribunal provision was included in the
Genocide Convention essentially for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of amending the Convention’s jurisdictional provisions in the future should an international tribunal with competence over
genocide be established. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 97th mtg. at 369, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR
61-140 (1948) (Mr. Demesmin, Haiti); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 130th mtg. at 675, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR 61-140 (1948) (Mr. DeBeus, Netherlands); U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., REPORT
ON INT’L CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE, 28 I.L.M. 754, 765
(1989). The specifics of creation of such a court and its competence were left open by the Convention.
This meant that even states parties to the Genocide Convention did not, by becoming parties, grant jurisdiction to or in any other way alter their status or the status of their nationals relative to any international court that might in the future be created. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 130th mtg. at
684, 676 U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 61-140 (1948) (remarks of Mr. Fitzmaurice, U.K.) (stating that the U.K.
“could not commit itself to support a court which did not yet exist and the scope of which was not
known,” and accepting Article VI only on the ground that it “put the court on a hypothetical, facultative basis and did not compel the parties to accept its jurisdiction”); LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 165-67 (1991); NEREMIAH ROBINSON, THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 80 (1960); Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
415, 461 (1998).
Neither does the Apartheid Convention constitute a precedent for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal over nationals of non-party states. The Apartheid Convention’s provisions regarding an
international penal tribunal echo those of the Genocide Convention, stating that persons charged with
the crime of Apartheid may be tried in the national courts of states parties or “by an international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those states Parties having accepted its jurisdiction.” International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973,
art. V, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (emphasis added). Moreover, even with that safeguard, the jurisdictional
provisions of the Apartheid Convention proved extremely controversial and were cited by many states
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The delegated universal jurisdiction theory of ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals, in sum, faces a number of difficulties. The delegated universal
jurisdiction theory does not account for a number of crimes within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the ICC that are not subject to universal jurisdiction.
More importantly, because universal jurisdiction delegated to an international
court would have materially different implications for states than would the exercise of universal jurisdiction by individual states, consent to the latter is not
equivalent to consent to the former. For that reason, customary development
of one should not be presumed to entail customary development of the other.
Rather, the question whether the delegation of universal jurisdiction is lawful requires a distinct analysis. In pursuing that analysis, we have found no
precedent in state practice for the delegation of universal jurisdiction to an international court. This absence of precedent precludes the possibility that delegability has been affirmatively entailed within the customary law of universal
jurisdiction as it has developed through state practice and opinio juris. It remains to be considered whether delegation of universal jurisdiction to an international court, even if not affirmatively entailed within the customary international law of universal jurisdiction, may nevertheless be lawful. That question
will be examined shortly. First, however, we will consider an alternative theory
supporting ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals, based on the delegated
territorial jurisdiction of states.
B. Delegated Territorial Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional provisions of the ICC Treaty suggest an alternative to the
delegated universal jurisdiction theory of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals. This alternative approach would rest on a theory of delegated territorial jurisdiction. The notion here is that, when a non-party national is prosecuted before the ICC for crimes committed on the territory of a state that
consents to ICC jurisdiction, the ICC exercises territorial jurisdiction that is
delegated to the Court by the territorial state. Under Article 12 of the ICC
Treaty, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction if the territorial state is a state party
or provides ad hoc consent. If the territorial state, which would ordinarily have
jurisdiction, may delegate that territorial jurisdiction to a court outside its own
national judicial system, including an international court, then arguably the ICC
may legitimately exercise that delegated jurisdiction.
Here, the question arises whether, as a matter of customary international
law, territorial jurisdiction may be delegated to an international court without
the consent of the defendant’s state of nationality. As we shall see, the consequences of delegated territorial jurisdiction are quite different from those of
territorial jurisdiction exercised by the territorial state, particularly for interstate-dispute type cases. As was true in the case of universal jurisdiction, beas among their reasons for rejecting the convention. See 27 YEARBOOK OF THE U.N. 100 (1973) (remarks of Finland [speaking also on behalf of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden], Turkey, United
States, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia, Costa Rica, Equador, and France).
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cause the implications of state-exercised jurisdiction and jurisdiction exercised
by an international court are not equivalent, states’ consent to one is not
equivalent to states’ consent to the other. We may not simply assume, therefore, that states’ territorial jurisdiction may be delegated to an international
criminal court as a matter of customary law.
It will be useful to consider first whether a state’s territorial jurisdiction may
be delegated to another state and then to ask whether it may be delegated to an
international court. It appears that a state may, under some circumstances,
delegate its territorial jurisdiction over a given case to another state.115 Delegated or “vicarious” jurisdiction is unproblematic when the defendant’s state of
nationality consents. Such vicarious exercise of jurisdiction with consent by the
state of nationality occurs, for example, among parties to the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.116
It is less clear that a state may delegate its territorial jurisdiction to another
state in the absence of consent by the defendant’s state of nationality. There
seems to be no precedent for such exercise of jurisdiction, including under the
European Convention on Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters.117 The
possibility of transfer of jurisdiction where the defendant is a national of a thirdparty state is not precluded by the terms of that convention, which provide that
“[f]or the purposes of applying this Convention, any Contracting state shall
have competence to prosecute under its own criminal law any offence to which
the law of another Contracting state is applicable.”118 It appears that in practice,
however, there has been no case of a transfer of criminal proceedings under the
convention in which the defendant was a national of a non-party to the convention and the state of nationality did not consent to the transfer.119 If such a
transfer of proceedings were attempted, involving a delegation of territorial jurisdiction without the consent of the defendant’s state of nationality, that state
of nationality might well protest the prosecution as an invalid exercise of jurisdiction. It would remain to be seen what the result would be of such a challenge.120
115. See Ethan A. Nadelman, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of
Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 37, 69-70 (1990) (discussing vicarious jurisdiction).
116. See The European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, Mar. 30,
1978, Europ. T.S. No. 73.
117. See id.
118. See id. art. 2(1).
119. See Communication from M. Cunha, Responsable de l’application des conventions pénales du
Conseil de l’Europe (conveyed via Marc Henzelin, University of Geneva Faculty of Law) (on file with
author).
120. In 1988, a Select Committee of Experts on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, convened by the Council of Europe’s Committee on Crime Problems, rendered an analysis of the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in Europe including jurisdiction exercised pursuant to the European Convention on Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SELECT COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1990). The
Committee did not, in the course of its deliberations or in its published study, examine the question of
the applicability of the convention to cases where defendants were non-party nationals. See Telephone
Interview with Maurice Harari, Scientific Expert, Council of Europe’s Select Committee of Experts on
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in Geneva, Switz. (May 10, 1999).
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If it is dubious that territorial jurisdiction may be delegated from one state
to another without consent by the state of nationality, it is even less clear that
territorial jurisdiction may be delegated, without that consent, to an international court. There has been no previous instance of delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international court. Of the four international courts in recent
history, the ICTY/R and the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, none has based
its jurisdiction on delegated territorial jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, the
ICTY/R base their jurisdiction on the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers,
and the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals each founded its jurisdiction on the
consent of the state of nationality.121 (Indeed, far from basing jurisdiction on
delegated territoriality, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal specifically indicated that the Tribunal was to prosecute war criminals “whose offenses have
no particular geographical location.”122)
Beyond the absence of precedent in state practice, there are legally significant reasons that states might object to the delegation of a state’s jurisdiction to
an international court. These reasons, elaborated earlier in the context of universal jurisdiction, arise from the fact that the consequences for states of the
compulsory jurisdiction of an international court are fundamentally different
from the consequences of the jurisdiction of national courts. As was discussed
at length above, the delegation of a state’s jurisdiction to an international court
may raise concerns for states regarding the diminished availability of compromise outcomes in interstate disputes, the heightened political impact of verdicts,
the role of an international court in shaping the law, and the possible impediments to diplomatic protection of nationals.123 Transforming territorial jurisdiction into ICC jurisdiction through delegation would thus produce jurisdictional
features entirely distinct from those envisioned in the customary law of territorial jurisdiction. For this reason, coupled with the absence of precedent for the
delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international court, it does not appear
that the customary international law of territorial jurisdiction, as that law has
evolved through state practice and opinio juris, has entailed the option of the
delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international court.
Not only does the delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international
court lack grounding in customary international law, but the delegation of
states’ territorial jurisdiction may also be subject to abuse. The primary basis
for the unquestioned place of territorial jurisdiction among internationally recognized bases for jurisdiction is the fact that the state where the crime occurred
is presumed to have a legitimate interest in seeing that the crime is punished.
That crucial linkage between territorial jurisdiction and the legitimate prosecutorial interests of the territorial state would be broken if territorial jurisdiction

121. See supra text accompanying notes 90-113.
122. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed thereto, Aug. 8, 1945, art.1, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
123. See supra Part IIIA1.
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were delegated to a state on whose territory the crime did not occur. With that
linkage broken, the door may be opened to the exercise of jurisdiction for illegitimate or abusive purposes.
To illustrate the problem, it may be helpful to consider an example involving a state-to-state delegation of jurisdiction. Imagine that France is holding for
trial a U. S. national who has committed a crime on French territory. The
United States has no basis to object to the exercise by France of its territorial
jurisdiction over the U. S. national. Now let us imagine that France proposes to
delegate its territorial jurisdiction to Libya and to transfer the defendant to
Libya for prosecution. (Just to flesh out the tale, let us say that Libya is holding
a French national for trial and is willing to transfer that case to France in exchange for the case of the U.S. national.) The United States would be correct in
arguing that Libya does not have territorial (or any other internationally recognized basis for) jurisdiction and that France cannot confer, by delegation or
otherwise, territorial jurisdiction upon a state on whose territory the conduct
did not occur. While France has a recognized and legitimate interest in the
punishment of the crime committed on French territory, Libya lacks that nexus
with the crime that forms the basis for territorial jurisdiction. Libya might be
motivated to make the jurisdictional trade for reasons that were illegitimate or
abusive, for instance, to strengthen its hand in its political dealings with the
United States. In any case, the traded jurisdiction would not conform with the
principles (in particular, the recognition of the legitimate prosecutorial interests
of the territorial state) on which territorial jurisdiction is founded.
The potential for abuse arising from delegation of territorial jurisdiction between individual states presumably is reduced where the jurisdiction is transferred not to an individual state but, rather, to an international court. Where
that international court is controlled by a large number of states, the various
states parties may provide checks and balances against abuses being perpetrated in the interests of one state or a small group of states. The ICC Treaty
provides that the treaty will come into force only when there are a minimum of
sixty states parties. Since most of those sixty or more states presumably would
be disinclined to permit the Court to be used for the corrupt purposes of one or
a few states, corrupt motives would be unlikely to prevail.
Nevertheless, while the potential for abuse may be thus reduced, it is not
eliminated. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world is not divided into opposing camps, as it was during the decades of the cold war. In the
current political context, sixty states would represent an assortment of crosscutting interests, which would make it difficult for one state or faction to turn
the court to the service of its own purposes. But the re-emergence of a bipolar
(or even tripolar) world, along any number of foreseeable or unforeseeable
fault lines, is not difficult to imagine. In a polarized world, sixty states could
represent one faction or at least be amenable to strong influence by one or a
few states. In such circumstances, the potential for the abusive delegation of
territorial jurisdiction would not be negated by the requirement that the ICC
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Treaty have at least sixty states parties to come into force. Rather, in those circumstances, permitting territorial jurisdiction to be treated as a form of negotiable instrument, to be used or conveyed, could have unintended and destructive consequences.
We have seen that there is an absence of precedent in state practice for the
delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international court. We also have
seen that such delegation would have implications and consequences that are
significantly different from those envisioned in the customary international law
of territorial jurisdiction. These factors, in combination, suggest strongly that
delegability to an international court is not entailed in the existing customary
law of territorial jurisdiction.
C. The Lawfulness of Delegated Universal Jurisdiction or Delegated
Territorial Jurisdiction as a Legal Innovation
Even if the option of delegating universal or territorial jurisdiction to an international court is not affirmatively encompassed within the existing customary
law of universal or territorial jurisdiction, such a delegation of jurisdiction might
nevertheless be lawful. The present section will consider this possibility.
In the Lotus Case,124 the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”)
stated in dictum that, where a prosecuting state’s jurisdiction is challenged, the
burden rests with the challenging state to show what rule of international law
the exercise of jurisdiction violates, and does not rest with the prosecuting state
to show what principle of international law supports the jurisdiction. If Lotus
were to be read in its strongest possible sense, then virtually all innovative bases
for jurisdiction, including delegation of states’ universal or territorial jurisdiction to the ICC, would be permissible since, being new, there would be, as yet,
no rule against them.125
But that strong reading of Lotus, even if it were good law when Lotus was
decided (which is itself doubtful126), is not an accurate description of the law
now.127 Rather than being strictly based on an open-endedly permissive view
that all jurisdiction is lawful unless the challenging state can point to a rule that
it violates, the customary international law of criminal jurisdiction is based on a
perceptible, if somewhat ill-defined, set of principles regarding the legitimate
prosecutorial interests of states. In most criminal cases, those underlying prin124. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
125. For an application of this approach to ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals, see Scharf,
supra note 68, at 72-73.
126. The Lotus decision was controversial. The decision was rendered by an evenly divided court,
with the president of the court breaking the tie with a casting vote. At the time of Lotus’s publication,
the academic literature was replete with vociferous objections to the court’s reasoning. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 n. 24 (4th ed. 1990) (and sources cited
therein); FRITZ A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 n.3 (1973) (and sources cited
therein).
127. See BROWNLIE, supra note 126, at 302-03; MANN, supra note 126, at 26-27; Prosper Weil, International Law Limitations on State Jurisdiction, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND
RESPONSES THERETO (Cecil Olmstead ed., 1983).
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ciples are not relied upon explicitly, because the customary law of criminal jurisdiction recognizes an identifiable set of valid bases for jurisdiction. When jurisdiction can be justified by reference to one of those recognized bases, as is
usually the case, reiteration of the underlying principles concerning the legitimate prosecutorial interests of states is not necessary.
The usual list of internationally recognized bases of jurisdiction includes:
territoriality, nationality, protective principle, universality, and passive personality (the last being the least robustly accepted). Some influential authorities
maintain that this list is exclusive.128 Because the list of recognized bases for jurisdiction is not arbitrary but has developed to reflect an evolving delineation of
the legitimate prosecutorial interests of states, it is unlikely that the list is actually closed. Rather, what appears to be true is that jurisdictional bases that are
already recognized are uncontroversially acceptable, while the legitimacy of
claimed new bases must be determined.
Michael Akehurst has noted that
[w]hat is significant is the fact that writers almost always list specific heads of jurisdiction, thereby implying that all other types of jurisdiction are illegal, instead of simply
stating the general presumption that all types of jurisdiction are legal and then listing
129
specific heads of jurisdiction which are proved to be illegal.

Akehurst is correct in observing that the practice of enumerating specific heads
of jurisdiction that are lawful, rather than listing heads of jurisdiction that are
prohibited, is both pervasive and significant. Any number of articles and briefs,
after briefly citing Lotus, proceed to devote lengthy arguments to demonstrating that the jurisdiction being argued for fits into one or more of the five recognized bases for jurisdiction. Lotus itself is a specimen of this sort. After articulating the broad “Lotus principle” that “restrictions on the independence of
states cannot . . . be presumed”,130 the court then proceeded to base its decision,
upholding a challenged exercise of jurisdiction, largely on an argument that the
jurisdiction asserted was a form of territorial jurisdiction. The court interpreted
territorial jurisdiction to encompass the territorial effects theory–which the
court was then at pains to demonstrate had been previously internationally accepted as a valid basis for jurisdiction!131
Were the lesson of Lotus very simply that jurisdiction is legitimate unless it
violates an identifiable rule, then it would be hard to explain why the Lotus
court went to great effort to show that the jurisdiction that it was upholding fell
within a previously approved category of jurisdiction. Whatever the Lotus
court’s dicta, its opinion in toto reflects the subtler reality that determining the
128. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 254-55, 257
(1991) (“[a]ny one of the [list of five] bases of jurisdiction just mentioned may meet the minimum international law requirements for jurisdiction to prescribe. If none is present, the application of domestic law in the particular case would be ‘exorbitant’ that is, impermissible.”); RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, II JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CRIME,
DRAFT CONVENTION WITH COMMENT, Supplement to 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 445, 446 (1935).
129. Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 145, 167 (1972-73).
130. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 18.
131. See id.
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acceptability of a claimed form of jurisdiction requires either the short-cut of
demonstrating that the jurisdiction falls within a previously accepted category,
or the more complex task of determining whether the form of jurisdiction
claimed comports with the underlying principles governing the international law
of jurisdiction.
In addition to the writings of courts and commentators, state practice too reflects the fact that there is an identifiable universe of recognized bases for jurisdiction under international law and an identifiable (even if not fully defined) set
of principles underlying those bases. When one state challenges another’s exercise of jurisdiction, the challenged state routinely responds by reference to one
or more of the internationally recognized bases for jurisdiction and, where warranted, to the rationales underlying those bases.132 This approach stands to reason. It cannot be that any new basis for jurisdiction, however extravagant or
nonsensical, is legitimate simply because it has not been previously claimed and
has, therefore, not been previously rejected.
The point here is not to question the very general precept of Lotus that international law leaves to states “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.”133 Rather, the point is that the general
precept articulated in Lotus must be read together with the other principles underlying and defining the customary law of jurisdiction. In short, the legitimacy
of claimed new forms of jurisdiction must be determined, not assumed. The
Lotus case places the burden of proof for this determination on the challenging
state, but Lotus does not eliminate the necessity of making the determination of
whether a claimed new form of jurisdiction is legitimate.
When a new basis for jurisdiction is claimed or proposed, its validity is
evaluated by consideration of its appropriateness, measured in terms of the underlying principles and rationales governing jurisdiction under customary international law. Typically, this evaluation of appropriateness has meant a form of
nexus analysis. The central question has been whether the conduct to be regulated is sufficiently linked to the legitimate interests of the state claiming jurisdiction to warrant recognition of jurisdiction. As Professor Mann puts it, “in essence criminal jurisdiction is determined not by such external, mechanical and
inflexible tests as territoriality or nationality, but by the closeness of a state’s
connection with, or the intimacy and legitimacy of its interests in, the facts in issue.”134
But this sort of nexus analysis would be inapposite in determining the appropriateness of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals. The ICC is not a
state and has no “interests” of its own apart from those delegated to it by the
states parties to the Treaty. This is where nexus analysis fails us: The legitimacy
132. See generally VAUGHN LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED
COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983) (reviewing a multitude of challenges by one state of another’s asserted jurisdiction); cf. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann , 36 I.L.R. 283-87 (1962) (citing Lotus to support jurisdiction but then relying extensively on other, positive bases).
133. See Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18.
134. See MANN, supra note 126, at 80.
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of the original jurisdiction (universal or territorial) of those states parties, based
on their legitimate state interests, is not questioned here. What is at issue,
rather, is the validity of the delegation of that jurisdiction, an issue with respect
to which nexus analysis is unhelpful.
In evaluating the appropriateness of the delegation of universal or territorial
jurisdiction, it may be useful to begin by articulating the basic principle, perhaps
rising to the level of a general principle of law, that legal relations that are
based on mutual consent (or acquiescence) may not be altered by one party to
the detriment of the other. In treaty law and contract law, this principle is reflected in the axiom “pacta sunt servanda.”135 In the context of customary international law, the principle prohibiting unilateral alteration of legal relations that
are based on consent or acquiescence is reflected in the requirement that customary law develop through pervasive state practice and opinio juris.
Universal and territorial jurisdiction exist within and are defined by customary international law. Customary international law, in turn, comes into being
through the consent or acquiescence of states over time. In this way, the definition and parameters of universal and territorial jurisdiction have come into being through the consent and acquiescence of states. The rights and obligations
of states relative to universal and territorial jurisdiction thus constitute a set of
legal relations based on mutual consent and acquiescence over time.
In the debate about ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals, there is no
controversy about the principle that legal relations based on mutual consent or
acquiescence may not unilaterally be materially altered.136 Nor is there any controversy over the proposition that the law of universal and territorial jurisdiction is customary law which, in turn, is founded on the consent or acquiescence
of states. Rather, the debate concerns whether incorporating the option of
delegating universal or territorial jurisdiction to an international court should
be considered to constitute a material alteration of the law of universal and territorial jurisdiction.
In addressing this question, we may benefit from an examination of the
treatment of an analogous question in another area of law. The law of assignments addresses the question of whether and when the delegation or, more
properly, the “assignment” of a right137 should be considered a material alteration to a legal relationship. The law of assignments outlines an approach to this
question that is suggestive for the present problem regarding the delegation of
jurisdiction.
In the assignments context, the question is whether a party holding a contractual right may assign that right to a third party. The basic principle of the
135. Translated as “Agreements (and stipulations) of the parties (to a contract) must be observed.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (5th ed. 1979).
136. Cf. infra Part IVB (regarding whether the ICC Treaty has already altered customary law).
137. In the context of the ICC debate, the word “delegation” has been used to refer to the transfer
of a right (to prosecute). This language is different from that used in the law of assignments, in which
“assignment” would refer to the transfer of a right while “delegation” would refer to transfer of an obligation.
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law of assignments, which is pervasively applied in municipal law138 and private
international law,139 is that rights may be assigned only when the assignment
does not prejudice the obligor’s position.140 As described in the Restatement of
Contracts 2d, “[a] contractual right may be assigned unless [] the substitution of
a right of the assignee for the right of the assignor would materially change the
duty of the obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on
him . . . .”141 While assignment is not generally a feature of public international
law,142 proposals to incorporate the concept of assignment into the law of treaties consistently treat as foundational the principle of non-prejudice to the interests of the obligor.143 The non-prejudice rule provides a method for upholding, in cases in which assignment of a right is contemplated, the principle that
legal relations that are based on mutual consent or acquiescence may not be
materially altered by one party to the detriment of the other.
As was argued earlier, the delegation of states’ universal or territorial jurisdiction to an international court would materially increase the risk or burden
imposed on a state whose national may be subject to prosecution for an international crime. This increased risk or burden arises, primarily in interstatedispute type cases,144 from the elimination of states’ discretion regarding methods of interstate dispute resolution, and from the potential practical, political,
and precedential disadvantages that this loss of discretion implies. Applying the
non-prejudice principle to the question whether states may delegate (or “assign”) jurisdiction to the ICC would lead to the conclusion that the delegation
of jurisdiction from a state to the ICC is not permissible without the consent of
what might be called the obligor state (the defendant’s state of nationality) because it would materially increase the burden or risk imposed on that state.
The point here is not to suggest that the law of assignments has legal force in
the very different field of the customary international law of jurisdiction. The
relevance of the law of assignments is that it is a body of law concerned centrally with the question of when the delegation of a right is permissible, and that
it offers a cogent framework for approaching that issue. The law of assignments
is therefore suggestive of how we might usefully evaluate whether and when the
delegation of jurisdiction should be considered permissible. That evaluation indicates that the delegation of states’ universal or territorial jurisdiction to the
ICC would be impermissible because it would materially alter the legal relation138. See MANN, supra note 126, at 363.
139. See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., DRAFT CONVENTION ON ASSIGNMENT OF
RECEIVABLES FINANCING: TEXT WITH REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.104 (July 16, 1999).
140. See MANN, supra note 126, at 363.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1981).
142. See BROWNLIE, supra note 126, at 678.
143. See, e.g., CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1992); MANN,
supra note 126, at 363 (“the paramount rule being that [the obligor’s] position is not to be prejudiced as
a result of the assignment”).
144. There may also be increased burdens and risks in individual-culpability cases if a state wishes to
provide diplomatic protection. See supra note 81.
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ships constituting the customary law of jurisdiction, and would do so to the detriment of non-party states without their consent.
The previous section of this article concluded that delegability to an international court is not a feature of universal or territorial jurisdiction under existing
customary international law. The present section, which has analyzed the appropriateness of delegated universal or territorial jurisdiction as an innovative
form of jurisdiction, suggests that delegation of universal or territorial jurisdiction to an international court would not constitute an appropriate innovation.
Consequently, it appears that conceptualizing ICC jurisdiction over non-party
nationals as the delegated jurisdiction of states does not provide an adequate
legal foundation for the jurisdiction claimed. The next and final part of this article will consider whether there may be some other legal foundation for ICC
jurisdiction over non-party nationals that does not rest on a theory of delegated
jurisdiction.
IV
JURISDICTION WITHOUT DELEGATION
Eliminating the delegated jurisdiction theories, as appears to be warranted,
leads us to consider whether there is a legal basis for the ICC Treaty’s creating
ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals as a strictly new base of jurisdiction.
Such a legal basis might rest upon a theory of global treaties, or a theory of the
ICC Treaty as generating new customary law, or on an analogy between the
ICC Treaty and the anti-terrorism treaties.
A. Global Treaties
It has been suggested that there exists a genre of treaties that are globally
binding because they foster the common interests of humanity.145 The ICC
Treaty might be thought to fall within that genre. If the ICC Treaty were globally binding, then all states would be bound to accept the treaty’s jurisdictional
provisions even if those provisions departed from the customary international
law of jurisdiction.
A threshold problem with the theory of global treaties is that there will inevitably be disagreement about what in fact will serve the common interests of
humanity. An equally formidable problem confronting the theory of global
treaties is that, even if that which would serve the common interests of humanity could be dispositively identified, that alone would not bind states who would
find unacceptable a particular distribution of the burdens involved in serving
those interests. For both of these reasons, the mere invocation of common interests does not resolve the matter.
An effort was made by some states to treat the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea as globally binding by virtue of its perceived importance for the

145. See GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 64-68
(1993).
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common interests of humanity.146 Just as one might expect, notwithstanding
declarations by some states that the deep sea-bed mining regime of the Law of
the Sea Convention was binding on non parties, non-party states rejected that
view and proceeded with legislation and agreements regarding reciprocal recognition of mining sites that were prohibited by the treaty.147 The point here is
not that states flout treaties. Rather, the point is that invocation of the interests
of humanity does not resolve political debate, and it has not proved successful
in binding non-parties to treaty obligations.
In the ICC context, the United States has argued, in effect, that humanity is
best served by the U.S. remaining free in its peacekeeping and humanitarian activities from such inhibitions as implementation of the current ICC Treaty
would pose.148 As Ambassador Scheffer has stated,
[t]he illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for non-parties to the
treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial and inherently
risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately
seek from the United States and other military powers. There will be significant new
149
legal and political risks in such interventions . . . .

Proponents of the ICC Treaty take the view that the benefits to humanity offered by implementation of the treaty would outweigh whatever might be lost
by way of inhibition of U.S. humanitarian action. Regardless of the merits of
that debate, invocation of the interests of humanity clearly does not resolve the
issue and only raises again the question of who has the right to decide. Claiming that a particular treaty serves the common interests of humanity does nothing fundamentally to alter the debate.
Before leaving this debate, however, we must examine what some might
view as the best example of a treaty entailing global application by virtue of its
claim to global benefits. This is the United Nations Charter and, particularly,
Article 2 of the charter, which enunciates the charter’s fundamental principles.
Article 2(6) of the charter states: “The organization shall ensure that states
which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these
principles so far as that may be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security.” Some authorities interpret that article as reflecting that
the charter imposes obligations on non-members of the United Nations.150 But
that view is controversial.151 An alternative interpretation is that
Article 2(6) is addressed to the United Nations and its members. While members of
the organization may be under a charter obligation to ensure that all states act in ac-

146. See id. at 66.
147. See id.
148. See supra text accompanying note 204.
149. David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12,
19 (1999).
150. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 126, at 694; RICHARD FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 185 (1970).
151. See generally BRUNO SIMMA ET AL., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 131-39 (1994) (discussing Article 2(6) of the U.N. Charter and the controversy regarding the legal effects of the charter on non-members of the U.N.).
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cordance with the Charter, as a treaty provision this rule still remains inter alios acta
for the third states which are under no legal duty to comply with it. Indeed, the practice of non-member states shows that they do not consider themselves as legally bound
152
by the Charter of the United Nations.

Certainly, non-members of the United Nations, including Switzerland, take the
view that they are not bound by the charter.153
Whatever may be the current status of U.N. Charter Article 2(6) with
regard to binding third parties, the only relevant issue in drawing an analogy
with the current status of the ICC Treaty is the status of third parties relative to
the charter at the time of its adoption. Even if we were to assume that
customary law has developed in the years since the charter’s adoption, such that
the principles referred to in Article 2(6) are now binding on non-parties, this
would imply nothing for the ICC Treaty except that, in future years, customary
law might develop such that aspects of the ICC Treaty would pass into
customary law and thereby become binding on non-parties to the Treaty.154
What is relevant for present purposes is not whether the U.N. Charter has come
to bind non-parties as a matter of subsequent custom but whether it bound nonparties upon its adoption by virtue of its humanitarian aims and global
purposes. 155
The present analysis of whether Article 2(6) was regarded as binding on
non-parties at the time of the U.N. Charter’s adoption will be limited to analysis
of the U.N. Charter as a multilateral treaty. There are those who argue that Article 2(6) has bound non-members since the charter’s adoption by virtue of the
charter’s being a “world constitution”156 or other unique instrument.157 Whatever the merits of those claims, they are, by their very nature, inapplicable to
the ICC Treaty. Viewing the charter as a treaty (and therefore analogous in at
least some ways to the ICC Treaty), we must conclude that the charter did not,
upon adoption, bind third parties to obligations not previously existing under
customary law.
Bentwich and Martin’s 1950 Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations states:
[T]he Charter does not purport to impose legal obligations on non-members. It does,
however, impose upon the Organization itself an obligation to ensure–by persuasion,
if possible, but by the application of force, if necessary–the compliance of non-

152. DANILENKO, supra note 145, at 60; see also RICHARD A. FALK, The Authority of the United
Nations to Control Non-Members 73-74 (1965). But see Kunz, Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 119,124 (1947) (taking the view that this analysis evades the core
issue of the legal authority of the United Nations to exercise power over non-members); OPPENHEIMLAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 928 (8th ed. 1955) (same).
153. See 26 SJIR 84-88 (1970) (official statement of Swiss position); 39 SJIR 264-67 (1983) (same).
154. As to the question whether customary law developments prompted by the charter itself have
given rise to a new customary regime of global treaties, see infra text accompanying notes 169-180.
155. The prospect of the ICC Treaty passing into customary law will be considered infra Part IVB.
156. FALK, supra note 152, at 51; see, e.g., ROSS, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 32
(1950); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998).
157. See FALK, supra note 152, at 66-67, 70, 101.
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members with the Principles of the United Nations. The former will have to obey not
158
as a matter of law, but as the result of the realities of power.

Numerous such commentaries, reflecting the view that the U.N. Charter did not
legally bind non-parties, were written in the early years of the United Nations’
existence. Those early commentators on the U.N. Charter who viewed the
charter as a treaty virtually uniformly took this position.159
There is also reflected in the writing of that time, however, an increasing anticipation that the advent of the U.N. system itself and its charter provisions
might lead to an erosion in some contexts of the principle that treaties cannot
bind third parties. The treatment of this issue in successive editions of the Oppenheim-Lauterpacht treatise on international law is illustrative. Lauterpacht
wrote in the seventh edition in 1948 that “[n]on-members are not bound by [Article 2(6)] and they may choose to react accordingly.”160 By the eighth edition,
published in 1955, Lauterpacht wrote,
International Law does not as yet recognize anything in the nature of a legislative process by which rules of law are imposed upon a dissenting minority of states. However,
in proportion as international society is transformed into an integrated community, a
departure from the accepted principle becomes unavoidable, in particular in the
sphere of preservation of international peace and security. . . . Both the Covenant . . .
and the Charter . . . must therefore be regarded as having set a limit, determined by
the general interest of the international community, to the rule that a treaty cannot
161
impose obligations upon states which are not parties to it.

There is a similar progression in the treatment of Article 2(6) in successive
editions of Goodrich and Hambro’s commentaries on the U.N. Charter. The
first edition, published in 1946 states that
[t]he Charter does not of course create any legal obligation for states not Members of
the Organization. They are therefore not obligated in a legal sense to act according to
the Principles of the Charter for any purpose whatsoever. The Charter system therefore provides for the imposition, by force if necessary, of the prescribed conduct with162
out any legal basis in contractual agreement.

By 1949, Goodrich and Hambro had softened their language, stating, “[i]t is
doubtful whether an international instrument can impose legal obligations on
states which are not parties to it. The traditional theory, which is not unanimously held [here, the authors cite Kelsen], is that treaties cannot obligate third
parties.”163

158. NORMAN BENTWICH & ANDREW MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 14 (1950).
159. See, e.g., id. at 14; LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD I. HAMBRO, THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 108-10 (1st ed. 1946); 1 GUGGENHEIM,
LEHRBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 92 (1948); I OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
928-29 (7th ed. 1948); Kunz, General International Law and the Law of International Organizations, 48
AM. J. INT’L L. 456, 457 (1953); Kunz, supra note 152, at 119-26; cf. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW
OF NATIONS 168 (1948).
160. 1 OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 652 (8th ed. 1955).
161. Id.
162. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD I. HAMBRO, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 71 (1st ed. 1946).
163. Id. at 108-09 (2d ed. 1949).
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Hans Kelsen has indeed been prominently, but somewhat erroneously, associated with the view that Article 2(6) bound non-members to new obligations
from the time of the charter’s adoption. He stated in his 1950 book that
non-Member states are obliged by the Charter, just as Members are, to settle their
disputes by peaceful means, to refrain in the relation to other States from the threat or
use of force, to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against
164
which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

But Kelsen seems to have meant not that this interpretation of Article 2(6) was
law in 1950 but, rather, that such an interpretation of Article 2(6) could or
should be law, the final ascertainment of which, however, would have to await
the development of custom. As Kelsen wrote, continuing the passage quoted
above:
From the point of view of existing international law, the attempt of the Charter to apply to states which are not contracting parties to it must be characterized as revolutionary. Whether it will be considered as a violation of the old, or as the beginning of
165
a new international law, remains to be seen.

Thus, the prevailing view at the time of the U.N. Charter’s adoption was
that it was not binding on non-parties. There was some thought in the years
following its adoption that the emergence of the U.N. system and the very fact
of the charter’s adoption, including Article 2(6), might effect a movement away
from the strict application of the pacta tertiis principle. In retrospect, we may
fairly conclude that such an expectation was not fulfilled. Rather, the scope of
coverage of Article 2(6) remains somewhat controversial,166 and the authorities
that do view the charter provisions as binding on non-parties generally maintain
that this is so as a consequence of the development of customary law concerning
the charter, not by virtue of an exception to the pacta tertiis principle.167 Significantly, the U.N. Charter has not proven to be the herald of a new era of international law featuring global treaties that bind parties and non-parties alike.
The U.N. Charter thus does not provide a precedential foundation for the
ICC Treaty’s binding non-parties. It would be bootstrapping to suggest that a
theory of global treaties can be supported by a reference to the U.N. Charter,
which itself was not regarded as “global” when adopted and which, even now,
can claim universal applicability, if at all, only by virtue of the usual processes of
customary law development.
In the end, the global treaty theory as a basis for ICC jurisdiction over nonparties is untenable not only as a matter of customary law but also as a practical
matter. The practical problem is that the theory of global treaties merely reframes the question whether a treaty may bind non-parties as the question

164. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 107 (1950).
165. Id. at 110; see also Verdross, Le Nazioni Unite e i Terzi state, 2 LA COMUNITA
INTERNAZIONALE 455 (1947) (taking a similar view).
166. See SIMMA ET AL., supra note 151, at 131-39.
167. See id. at 137-38.
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whether a treaty may bind non-parties if it purports to pronounce what is best
for humanity–without providing any means for resolving the inevitable disagreements about what is best for humanity and about distributing the burdens
of achieving humanitarian goals.
The existence of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations does not help
to resolve these issues. Jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations include
obligations on states to prevent and perhaps, in some circumstances, to prosecute and punish genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity–the crimes
that form the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC.168 But those jus cogens
norms and erga omnes obligations do not include a requirement that prevention
and punishment occur through the mechanism of an international criminal
court. Even while customary jus cogens and erga omnes norms have evolved in
certain areas of substantive law, customary law has not developed, as we have
seen, to require enforcement of that substantive law through an international
court. In fact, as has been discussed, there are reasons for which alternatives to
international adjudication may sometimes be preferable in cases that involve interstate legal disputes. Reference to the universally binding nature of the substantive norms of international criminal law cannot be relied on to do double
duty to form the basis also for an argument that use of the ICC mechanism is
also obligatory or that the ICC Treaty is a global treaty, with jurisdictional obligations binding on all states.
B. The ICC Treaty as Generating Customary Law
Even if a treaty cannot be said to bind non-parties simply by virtue of its
claim to serving humanity, there remains the possibility that the content of a
treaty may become part of customary law and thereby bind non-parties. Viewing the ICC solely in its posture as an adjudicator of individual culpability, one
might conclude that ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals would constitute
only an incremental step in the development of customary law from the existing
customary law of universal or territorial jurisdiction. When the ICC’s role as an
adjudicator of interstate disputes is also taken into account, however, the difference between states’ universal or territorial jurisdiction and ICC jurisdiction is
revealed to be very significant, as we have seen. When this second aspect of the
ICC’s character is considered, it becomes clear that establishing customary law
supporting ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals would involve not a minor
or an incremental step but a distinct new departure in the law of jurisdiction.
Considering the process by which the content of a treaty may become part
of customary law, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Continental
Shelf case stated that,

168. See generally ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES (1996) (on development of the erga omnes and jus cogens doctrines as applicable to international crime); cf. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L.
413 (1983) (questioning the wisdom of development of the jus cogens and erga omnes doctrines).
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[w]ith respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law, it
might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very
widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself,
provided it included that of states whose interests were specially affected. . . .
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a
bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what
was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that
within the period in question, short though it might be, state practice, including that of
states whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;–and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obliga169
tion is involved.

It would be difficult to argue that the ICC Treaty has generated customary
law supporting ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals. There has been no
period of time in which “extensive and virtually uniform” state practice has
supported the form of jurisdiction in question. This is true even if we take the
adoption of the ICC Treaty by 120 states at the Rome conference as a form of
state practice.170 Even in a situation in which a treaty faced less opposition than
did the ICC Treaty (seven states voted against adoption, twenty-one states abstained),171 reliance on adoption of a treaty at a diplomatic conference alone
would be a precarious basis for a claim of creation of customary law. In the
case of the ICC Treaty, with only twenty-seven states parties and 139 signatories at present,172 the ICC Treaty cannot be said to enjoy participation that is
“very widespread and representative” much less “virtually uniform.” As the
ICJ stated in the Continental Shelf case, “the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is . . . hardly sufficient. That non-ratification may sometimes be due to factors other than active disapproval of the convention concerned can hardly constitute a basis on which positive acceptance of its
principles can be implied.”173
Nor does such participation as there is in the ICC Treaty actually include
“that of states whose interests are specially affected.” The United States, which
is disproportionately involved in military activities throughout the world, has
vocally rejected aspects of the treaty, most particularly including its jurisdictional provisions.
169. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den. v. F.R.G.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 42-43 (Feb. 20).
170. On the debate regarding the treatment of treaty participation as a form of state practice for
purposes of customary law development, see ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4, 89-90, 103-65 (1971); Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 717, 724-26 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989); Arthur
Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1
(1988).
171. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent
International Court, Press Release L/ROM/22, July 17, 1998 (visited Mar. 22, 2000) <http://www.un.org/
icc/>.
172. United Nations, Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: Ratification Status (last modified
Dec. 31, 2000) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status/htm>.
173. Continental Shelf, 169 I.C.J. at 42.
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Perhaps the most illuminating point regarding whether participation in the
ICC Treaty can currently be said to constitute state practice sufficient to have
generated customary law is simply that the treaty, by its own terms, requires
sixty ratifications or accessions before it can come into force. The treaty’s
drafters recognized that this was the minimum degree of support that would be
required before the ICC could become a credible international court. Because
the treaty does not yet have the degree of adherence that the court’s supporters
recognized was required to make the court a credible international institution,
and because the jurisdictional issue was among the most controversial aspects in
the treaty negotiations,174 it is difficult to see how the treaty can be said already
to have sufficient adherence, particularly on the issue of jurisdiction, to constitute the necessary state practice to generate customary law on ICC jurisdiction.
A number of scholars of customary international law have argued that state
practice is not a separate element required for the generation of customary law
but is relevant only as evidence of opinio juris.175 Based on that view, some have
argued for the possibility of instant custom.176 All, however, ultimately rest their
arguments for instant custom on the existence of consensus or virtual consensus
regarding the subject at issue–a consensus which is obviously lacking in the case
of the ICC Treaty.
Bin Cheng’s theory of “instant customary law” begins with the premise that
the fundamental substance of customary international law is opinio juris. Practice, he reasons, is not a constitutive element of custom but, rather, provides
evidence of the existence and content of the requisite opinio juris. As he puts it,
[i]f States consider themselves bound by a given rule as a rule of international law,
it is difficult to see why it should not be treated as such in so far as these states are
concerned, especially when the rule does not infringe the right of third states not
sharing the same opinio juris. . . .
From this point of view, there is no reason why an opinio juris communis may not
grow up in a very short period of time among all or simply some Members of the
United Nations with the result that a new rule of international customary law comes
into being among them. . . .
There is no reason why a new opinio juris may not grow overnight between States
so that a new rule of international customary law (or unwritten international law)
177
comes into existence instantly.

In Cheng’s theory of “instant custom,” then, we find simply the proposition that
those who agree to be bound now may be bound now but may not bind others.178

174. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal
Court: the Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 7-9 (1999).
175. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. OF INT’L L. 23 (1965).
176. See, e.g., id.
177. Cheng, supra note 175, at 37, 46.
178. Even this proposition, which seems unexceptionable on its face, may in fact be problematic. By
eliminating the requirement of consistent state practice over some period of time before binding customary law is created, Cheng would seem to suggest that states should be irrevocably bound without a
period of time in which to observe and consider the incipient rule in practice.
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Anthony D’Amato has made a similar point, though he places greater emphasis on the need for consensus if all, rather than only some, states are to be
bound:
To the extent that a widely adopted multilateral convention represents the consensus
of states on the precepts contained therein those precepts are part of international law
by that fact alone. In this sense, multilateral treaties are and historically have been
more important than bilateral ones. But this effect is not due to anything connected
with the concept of custom; it involves a separate phenomenon–“consensus”–which
179
deserves separate study as to its nature, identification and provability.

The theory of instant customary law and D’Amato’s closely related theory
of consensus can be eliminated as plausible bases for ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals. Those theories rest, as they must, on the observation that if
consent is so pervasive as to be consensus then, all agreeing to be bound, all are
bound. Such a consensus, or even pervasive acquiescence including specially interested states, is conspicuously absent in the case of the ICC Treaty. The
treaty thus cannot currently be said to have created custom, instant or otherwise, with regard to ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals.180
C. The Terrorism Treaties
A number of treaties, primarily concerned with terrorism and concluded in
the 1970s and 1980s,181 have been understood by some to “create” universal jurisdiction over the crimes that are the subject matter of those treaties.182 It has
been suggested that the terrorism treaties reflect a power of states to create, by
treaty, extraterritorial jurisdiction having no other legal basis, and then to apply
that jurisdiction to the nationals of non-party states. If the terrorism treaties
can thus create jurisdiction that can be exercised over non-party nationals, the
argument proceeds, then the ICC Treaty must be able to do the same. As will
be demonstrated in the following pages, the terrorism treaties, if they “create”
universal jurisdiction at all, do so by contributing to the development of customary law, not through some exceptional form of fiat by treaty. The terrorism
treaties thus cannot be relied upon as precedents validating ICC jurisdiction
over non-party nationals.

179. D’AMATO, supra note 170, at 165.
180. Even if the ICC Treaty has not as yet generated customary law supporting ICC jurisdiction
over non-party nationals, such custom could conceivably emerge in the future. If and when such a development should take place, the United States presumably would be in a position to claim persistent
objector status with regard to ICC jurisdiction over its nationals, having clearly articulated its objections to the purported jurisdiction immediately and consistently from the time it was proposed. For
analyses of the preconditions for and consequences of persistent objector status, see Jonathan Charney,
Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993); David Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 957 (1986).
181. See infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 68, at 99-100.
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Treaties on hijacking183 and other crimes on aircraft,184 crimes against the
safety of maritime navigation,185 hostage-taking,186 attacks on internationally protected persons187 and U.N. personnel,188 terrorist bombings,189 and torture,190 each
contains provisions permitting a state party to prosecute individuals believed to
have committed the enumerated crimes when such individuals are found within
its territory. As no link other than the presence of the suspect is required, jurisdiction would not be based on territoriality, nationality, protective principle, or
passive personality but, rather, upon universality of jurisdiction. Because the
crimes covered by the treaties in question arguably were not previously recognized as entailing universal jurisdiction, and yet the treaties provide that universal jurisdiction may be exercised over those crimes, the treaties, it is argued,
must have created universal jurisdiction over those crimes.
But that conclusion must be incorrect. States are not obliged simply to accept purported new subjects of universal jurisdiction. In the absence of customary law recognizing universal jurisdiction over a given crime, each state may acquiesce in or protest against a proposed new subject of universal jurisdiction. In
the event of a protest, the ensuing debate would invoke the usual criteria for determining the legitimacy of a new form of jurisdiction.191 Customary law governing the matter would then emerge accordingly. The terrorism treaties that
some believe to create universal jurisdiction represent agreements by the states
parties not to object when others (or, at least, other states parties) exercise jurisdiction as delineated by the treaties. But the treaties cannot bind non-parties
also to accept the treaties’ terms.
How, then, are we to understand the import of the treaties that do appear
on their face to purport to create universal jurisdiction? Are they simply void,
having exceeded the bounds of the customary international law of universal ju-

183. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
184. See Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention of
Sept. 23, 1971, Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-19.
185. See Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668.
186. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, TIAS No. 11,081,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
187. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
188. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 15, 1995, U.N.
GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 1, at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (Jan. 9, 1994), 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995).
189. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998).
190. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Torture is not a terrorism offense, but the Torture Convention’s jurisdictional provisions fit within the mold of the provisions
found in the terrorism conventions.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 124-144.
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risdiction? Some have taken that view.192 An alternative theory, however,
would view the treaties as “proposing” the development of customary law.
The terrorism treaties that are cited as creating universal jurisdiction all
concern crimes that already were, at the time of the treaties’ conclusion, prime
candidates for universal jurisdiction. Some of the crimes were already considered by some to entail universal jurisdiction.193 And even those that arguably
did not yet entail universal jurisdiction shared the principal indicia of crimes
over which universal jurisdiction is thought to be suitable. They were crimes of
substantial seriousness, of concern to all states, and that are difficult to control
without substantial international cooperation.194 What the treaties did was, in
effect, to propose–to articulate195 in a clear form–the suggestion that the crimes
become recognized as entailing universal jurisdiction. States were then free to
respond to that proposal, by active acceptance (in becoming states parties to the
treaties) or active rejection (by objecting to the treaties or to prosecutions
brought pursuant to them) or passive acquiescence (by accepting, or refraining
from objecting to, the treaties or prosecutions pursuant thereto). As D’Amato
has put it,
[t]he articulation of a rule of international law–whether it be a new rule or a departure
from and modification of an existing rule–in advance of or concurrently with a positive
act (or omission) of a state gives a state notice that its action or decision will have legal
implications. In other words, given such notice, statesmen will be able freely to decide
whether or not to pursue various policies, knowing that their acts may create or mod196
ify international law.

It appears that, as one might have predicted, the response to the jurisdictional provisions of the terrorism treaties has been acceptance and acquiescence. There have been a number of prosecutions under the terrorism treaties
of individuals who were not nationals of states parties to those treaties, and yet
there appears to be, thus far, no case in which the defendant’s state of nationality has objected to that exercise of jurisdiction.

192. See, e.g., Jordan Paust, Extradition of the Achille-Lauro Hostage-Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 235, 254 (1987) (“[u]niversal jurisdiction by treaty under the
Hostages Convention . . . is highly suspect with regard to defendants who are not nationals of a signatory to the Hostages Convention.”).
193. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785,
834-38 (1988);
194. Michael Akehurst has made a similar observation:
Hijacking is probably not covered by the definition of piracy in international law, but there is
doctrinal authority for the view that it is subject to universal jurisdiction nevertheless; Japan in
fact claimed universal jurisdiction even before the Hague Convention. Hijacking threatens international communications to the same extent as piracy; it is an attack on international order
and injures the international community as a whole, which means that all states have a legitimate interest in repressing it. The policy reasons which justify universal jurisdiction over piracy justify it equally in the case of hijacking.
Akehurst, supra note 129, at 161-62.
195. On the role of articulation in the development of customary international law, see D’AMATO,
supra note 170, at 74-87.
196. Id .at 75.
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In the Yunis case,197 for example, the United States prosecuted a Lebanese
national under the United States’ implementing legislation for the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft198 and the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.199 Lebanon was a party to the former but not the latter convention. Nevertheless, Lebanon raised no objection
to the prosecution of Yunis for hostage taking.
It is significant to note as well that the United States, in Yunis, did not take
the position that the terrorism treaties themselves created universal jurisdiction.
Rather the United States in its appellate brief argued that
the universal and passive personality theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction “together
provide ample ground [ ] to assert jurisdiction over Yunis”, [quoting the trial court’s
opinion in Yunis].
As that [trial court] decision explains, the universal theory recognizes that certain
offenses are so heinous and widely condemned that “any state if it captures the offender may prosecute and punish that person on behalf of the world community regardless of the nationality of the offender or victim or where the crime was committed.”
Both the offenses of the aircraft hijacking and hostage taking fall squarely within
this principle. Air piracy has been condemned by the 143 nations that are signatories
of the Hague Convention, a treaty that, as explained previously, expressly authorizes
the prosecution on the basis of the universal principle. Hostage taking has been condemned by the international community in the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, which, likewise, recognizes the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the universal theory. Congress was, therefore, well within its authority
to create extraterritorial criminal jursidiction over such universally condemned crimes.
The offense of hostage taking is also cognizable under the “passive personality”
theory of jurisdiction which authorizes a state to assert jurisdiction over offenses
200
commited against their citizens abroad.

United States v. Rezaq201 is the other case sometimes cited to demonstrate
that the United States prosecutes nationals of states not parties to the terrorism
treaties under legislation implementing those treaties. But Rezaq, a Palestinian,
was not a national of a state whose treaty participation the United States would
have recognized or whose diplomatic objection the United States would have
recognized even if, contrary to the facts as they actually unfolded, an attempt
had been made to lodge a protest against the exercise of jurisdiction over
Rezaq.202 Because of those features of the Rezaq case, the fact that no state ob-

197. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988); United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
198. Supra note 184.
199. Supra note 186.
200. Brief for the United States at 32-34, United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (No.
89-3208).
201. United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1995); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F. 3d 1121
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
202. See Telephone Interview with Scott Glick, prosecuting attorney in United States v. Rezaq, U.S.
Department of Justice, Terrorism Division, in Washington, DC, Sept. 15, 1999. A claim, by Rezaq, to
Jordanian nationality would not have been helpful to his case. Jordan was a party to the hijacking convention pursuant to which Rezaq was prosecuted. See id.
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jected to the prosecution of Rezaq does little to clarify one way or the other the
status of the terrorism treaties relative to the customary law of universal jurisdiction.
As of the time of this writing, there have been, to the author’s knowledge,
no diplomatic protests against the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the
crimes that form the subject matter of the terrorism treaties. If that trend continues, then, with sufficient time and state practice, universal jurisdiction over
these crimes will pass into customary law.
Through the catalyst of a treaty proposing a new application of universal jurisdiction, the usual processes of customary law development may be accelerated. This occurs not through any deviation from the usual principles governing
the development of custom, but simply through an increased rate of occurrence
of those actions (acceptance, acquiescence, expressions of opinio juris, and the
like) through which customary law develops.203 The treaty itself does not “create” universal jurisdiction, and it could not do so insofar as that would involve
the alteration of customary international law without the necessary processes of
state practice and opinio juris. Rather, each of the treaties floats a clear proposal for response. If a non-party state were to object to the jurisdiction proposed or to its exercise (as has occurred in the case of the ICC Treaty), the validity of the jurisdiction would have to be evaluated in the usual way. A
determination would have to be made as to whether the claimed new basis of

A similar circumstance arose in the case of Public Prosecutor v. S.H.T., a case prosecuted in the
Netherlands pursuant to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra
note 183, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
supra note 184, in which the defendant “had been born in Jerusalem and was a resident of East Jerusalem.” Public Prosecutor v. S.H.T., 74 INT’L L. REPORTS 162, 163 (1987).
203. This approach to the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of the terrorism treaties is reflected in Professor Schachter’s reasoning. As he has written,
several multinational conventions dealing with crimes of international significance such as hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, hostage-taking, [and] injury to internationally protected persons . . . oblige the parties to extradite or alternatively try and punish individuals accused of
the crime covered by the convention. A significant feature is that the treaty obligation applies
to all offenders apprehended by the state in question, whether the crime was committed in or
outside of the state and whether or not it involved injury to nationals. An inference has been
drawn from the fact that these conventions have been adopted and ratified by a large number
of states that ‘universal jurisdiction’ applies to the crimes in question. . . . The reasoning here
is that if a large number of states have agreed to the obligation to try and punish such offenses,
the states must, as a matter of logic, have the right to exercise such jurisdiction under general
(i.e., customary) international law. It follows that the right under customary law extends to all
states, parties and non-parties. . . .
To reach the conclusion that customary law allows for universal jurisdiction in regard to
the crimes covered by the treaties, one has to rely on three conditions:
1) The adoption of the conventions by overwhelmingly large majorities of states;
2) The implication drawn from these conventions that international law permits
states to exercise jurisdiction on a universal basis in regard to the crimes in question;
and
3) The widespread ratification of the Conventions considered as relevant State practice that conforms to the implicit customary law principle stated in (2) above.
Schachter, supra note 170, at 725-26.
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jurisdiction comported with the principles underlying and defining the customary international law of jurisdiction.
The merits of this theory of the terrorism treaties as proposing the development of custom may be clarified by a contrasting example. Imagine that, rather
than providing for universal jurisdiction over hijacking, hostage taking, and the
like, the treaties had provided for universal jurisdiction over larceny. The larceny treaty or prosecutions brought pursuant thereto presumably would have
been objected to promptly by states preferring to retain exclusive jurisdiction
over larceny committed on their own territory when that larceny has no special
link with other states. It is hard to imagine how the larceny treaty’s universal
jurisdiction provisions could be defended. Non-party states would readily prevail by showing that there is no support in customary law principles for the
claimed jurisdiction and that treaties to which they are not parties cannot “create” otherwise baseless jurisdiction over crimes committed on their territories.
The difference between the hypothetical larceny treaty and the terrorism
treaties is that the various forms of terrorism, if and to the extent that they were
not already subject to universal jurisdiction at the time of the treaties’ promulgation, were likely candidates for universal jurisdiction (meaning that such jurisdiction was likely to be accepted and become customary), while larceny is
not. The crimes covered by the terrorism treaties are crimes of concern to all
states regardless of where the offense is committed, and are crimes of the sort
that would be difficult to control without substantial international cooperation.
Ordinary larceny, by contrast, shares neither of those characteristics. For that
reason, states would be unlikely to accept the universal jurisdiction proposed in
the hypothetical larceny treaty even while states appear, thus far, to be willing
to accept the universal jurisdiction proposed in the terrorism treaties.
To the extent that the terrorism treaties are viewed as proposing a new feature of customary law, subject to acceptance or rejection by non-parties, they
are a potentially constructive contribution to international legal development.
Viewed as an attempt simply to impose otherwise baseless jurisdiction over the
nationals of non-party states without those states’ consent, the treaties would
simply be void.
The terrorism treaties do not represent any exceptional power to create universal jurisdiction by treaty or in any other exceptional way to alter the customary international law of jurisdiction. Rather, the terrorism treaties, properly
viewed, are an example of the development of customary international law
through the catalyst of treaty making. All that treaties can do, relative to the
incorporation of new bases of jurisdiction into the customary law of jurisdiction,
is to propose the desired innovation. Where the proposal is widely accepted,
the jurisdictional innovation will pass into custom. The terrorism treaties appear to exemplify this process. The hypothetical treaty providing for universal
jurisdiction over larceny is an example of a proposal that would be rejected and,
consequently, would not generate custom. The ICC Treaty, and in particular its
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jurisdictional provisions, can do no more than to propose a jurisdictional innovation to be accepted or rejected by states.
V
CONCLUSION
The ICC is intended to do an overwhelmingly important job. An international criminal court would, in many instances, be the only meaningful forum in
which to pursue justice for crimes of the greatest enormity. The dilemma underlying the debate about ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals stems primarily from the conflicting needs for the ICC to have sufficient jurisdictional
powers to bring to justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, and, simultaneously, for states to retain appropriate discretion regarding methods of dispute settlement when the lawfulness of their official acts is in dispute.
Given the terms of the ICC Treaty, the ICC would very likely engage in the
compulsory adjudication of interstate disputes through the mechanism of criminal prosecutions, a prospect that many states will, and perhaps should, reject.
Fundamental principles of international law reserve to states the right to resolve
their disputes by such mechanisms as they find most suitable, limited by such
obligations as they have agreed to by treaty or become bound to by custom.
The resolution of interstate disputes by the ICC through the mechanism of
criminal prosecutions is not a method that non-parties to the ICC Treaty have
agreed by treaty to or become bound to by custom. Thus, the very treaty that
would establish a new court to enforce international law may itself breach important international legal principles. Until this basic issue is confronted and
satisfactorily resolved, the ICC and, in turn, the critical human interests that the
court is intended to serve, will likely suffer from a damaging lack of participation. President Clinton’s remarks, in his statement authorizing U.S. signature of
the ICC Treaty, are telling in this regard. As he stated:
In signing, however, we are not abandoning our concerns about significant flaws in
the treaty. In particular, we are concerned that when the court comes into existence,
it will not only exercise authority over personnel of states that have ratified the treaty,
but also claim jurisdiction over personnel of states that have not. . . .
Court jurisdiction over U.S. personnel should come only with U.S. ratification of the
treaty. The United States should have the chance to observe and assess the functioning of the Court, over time, before choosing to become subject to its jurisdiction.
Given these concerns, I will not, and do not recommend that my successor submit the
Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satis204
fied.

204. Associated Press, Clinton’s Words: “The Right Action”, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6 (reprinting the text of President Clinton’s statement authorizing U.S. signature of the ICC Treaty).

